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Abstract 
The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) has published several works that 
highlight significant progress in the planning and execution of Operational Contract 
Support. For example, The Yoder Three-tier Model for Optimal Planning and 
Execution of Contingency Contracting (YTTM) research project (NPS-AM-05-002), 
the Joint Effects-based Contracting project (NPS-AM-08-127), and many others are 
recent published works that may be instrumental in shaping public and military policy 
related to the structure, planning, and execution of Operational Contract Support. 
Of particular note is the NPS Joint Effects-based Contracting project (NPS-
AM-08-127), which created a new concept of Operational Contract Support and 
developed and exercised simulation modeling to demonstrate the efficacy of the 
concepts. A key element of the work was the identification and creation of a Phase 
“0” operational model. The results are that with the Phase “0” concept in operation, 
significant efficiencies and greater effectiveness can be achieved in planning and 
executing any operation requiring Operational Contract Support. 
This sponsored research report proposes and formulates the concept of 
contract integration into joint doctrine and planning documents as a key element of 
meeting potential gains in efficiency and effectiveness of operations, and in meeting 
elements of the revised title 10 U.S.C. section 2333, directly shaping public policy. 
Of particular concern to the author is that despite significant movement and progress 
in developing the Operational Contract Support construct, joint planners and 
practitioners in supported and supporting roles are still suboptimized due to the lack 
of an integrated structure and construct at the joint strategic level.  
The early planning phase parleyed terminology utilized by the warfighter and 
planning communities, aptly titled Phase Zero operations, that is, all planning and 
exercising that can and should occur prior to an actual real-world event or before a 
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provide a concept model that can guide planners and resource holders to create and 
utilize the recommended mix of personnel, platforms, and protocols to achieve better 
contracted effects, create efficiencies and effectiveness, and improve business 
operations across the full spectrum of war and peacetime operations. 
The research incorporates a thorough examination and review of key 
literature germane to the background and development of the work. The author 
creates a framework of integration into Phase Zero – shaping phase- doctrine and 
provides the construct for operation reality. 
This work will formulate and further develop operational construct concepts 
into executable concepts for incorporation into joint doctrine, planning documents, 
and business operations, and will explore implications for war-fighters, logisticians, 
and contracting offices. Specific conclusions and recommendations are provided in 
the final chapter, along with areas recommended for further research.     
The concepts developed and presented in this research report will meet the 
warfighter and legislative requirements for improved integrative planning, and will be 
optimized to complement and best support the Unified Combatant Commander’s 
desired effects as iterated in the Operation Plans and Operation Orders - OPLAN 
and OPORD - by incorporating a holistic approach of the right mix of credentialed 
personnel; refinement and utilization of existing platforms utilized in the joint 
planning environment; and implementing, exercising, and fully employing forward-
leaning protocols necessary for the creation of a sound business effect.  
Keywords: Contracting, Contingency Contracting, Expeditionary Contracting, 
Joint Planning, Joint Contract and Logistics Planning, Contracting workforce, Joint 
Doctrine, Joint Publication JP 4-10, Operational Phasing, Effects-based Contracting, 
Yoder Three-tier Model, Joint Operations Planning, Operational Contract Support, 
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I. Introduction and Objectives 
A. Background 
The Department of Defense’s (DoD) use of contractors has increased 
dramatically in the past decade. In Iraq alone, the number of contractor 
personnel now exceeds the number of uniformed military personnel. Congress 
has recently increased scrutiny and expressed concern over the significant 
challenges that the DoD faces in planning, executing, and managing Operational 
Contract Support. Among the many challenges are, for example, failure to 
adequately integrate contracting into operation planning, exercising and 
employment in actual crisis events. To address these concerns, Congress 
enacted an amendment to title 10 U.S.C. adding section 2333 directing the 
Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop joint 
policy for contingency and Operational Contract Support requirements definition, 
contingency program management, and contingency operations during combat 
and post-conflict operations. This mandate, in addition to concepts presented in 
this paper, create the framework for a better structure for planning and executing 
joint planning.  The research proposes concepts for integrating contract support 
into comprehensive plans for effective and efficient utilization of contractors in 
supporting roles across the full spectrum of war, peacetime, and other operations 
in which contractors will be integral to mission success.   
To date, Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports indicate that 
some progress has been made in Operational Contract Support.  However, it is 
essential that additional progress be made to ensure effective and efficient 
integration of contracted support into operations plans (OPLANs) and operations 
orders (OPORDs) in order to meet the increasing demands of the warfighter, the 
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The Naval Postgraduate School has published several works that highlight 
significant progress in the planning and execution of Operational Contract 
Support. For example, The Yoder Three-tier Model (YTTM) (NPS-AM-05-002), 
the Joint Effects-based Contracting project (NPS-AM-08-127), and many others, 
are recent published works that may be instrumental in shaping public and 
military policy related to the structure, planning, and execution of Operational 
Contract Support. 
Of particular note is the NPS Joint Effects-based Contracting project 
(NPS-AM-08-127), which created a new concept of operational contract support 
and developed and exercised simulation modeling to demonstrate the efficacy of 
the concepts. Among key elements of the work was the identification and 
creation of a Phase Zero operational model. The results are that with the Phase 
Zero concept in operation, significant efficiencies and greater effectiveness can 
be achieved in planning and executing any operation requiring Operational 
Contract Support. 
This sponsored research report proposes the concept of integration into 
joint doctrine and planning documents as a key element in meeting potential 
gains in efficiency and effectiveness of operations, and in meeting essential 
elements directly shaping public policy.  Of particular concern to the author is that 
despite significant movement and progress in developing the Operational 
Contract Support (OCS) construct, joint planners and practitioners in supported 
and supporting roles are still suboptimizing due to lack of an integrated structure 
and construct at the joint strategic level.  
This work will construct and further develop operational construct 
concepts into executable concepts for incorporation into joint doctrine, planning 
documents, business operations, and it will explore implications for warfighters, 
logisticians, and contracting offices. Specific conclusions and recommendations 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 3 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
This research incorporates a thorough examination and review of key 
literature germane to the background and development of this work. It creates a 
concept of integration to show the structure and conduct of integrating Phase 
Zero into doctrine and provides the construct for sound operation reality.   
B. Objective and Purpose of the Research—Key Planning 
Elements 
Planning and exercising is essential for warfighters and business 
practitioners alike. In the Unified Combatant Commanders’ arena, a significant 
amount of time, energy, and resources are devoted to the integrative planning 
and exercising of war plans. However, the same level of time, energy, and 
resources have been woefully omitted in integrating a key complementary 
support element for traditional logistics plans in even the most critical of 
Operations Plans (OPLANs)—including the plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom  
(Anderson & Flaherty, 2003). Integrated planning, wherein contract support 
design is fully integrated into operation plans and is fully exercised, is an 
essential and imperative element of sound doctrine and business practice. To 
highlight the need for integrative planning and the significant lack of an integrated 
planning structure, which failed to incorporate contracting into major war plans, 
joint applied project authors Flaherty and Anderson (2003) examined the 
Operation Iraqi Freedom OPLAN/OPORD Contingency Contracting Support Plan 
(CCSP) and found that it was regrettably deficient, and that it lacked sufficient 
structure and necessary detail.  
The planning of military operations should take into account all of the 
critical and essential elements to create the desired effect in concert and 
harmony with the Unified Combatant Commander’s intent. The researcher 
published a working paper titled The Yoder Three-Tier Model for Optimal 
Planning and Execution of Contingency Contracting (2003) that created the 
construct for a tiered structure, capitalizing on specific credential, experiential, 
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planning and operational and tactical execution of contracting functions (Yoder, 
2004).   
Subsequently, student researchers, and joint applied project and 
Acquisition Research Program sponsored research authors Kelly Poree, Karina 
Curtis, Jeremy Morrill, and Steven Sherwood (2008a, 2008b), further developed 
the Yoder Three-tier Model through incorporation of key planning elements and 
methodologies, such as strategic purchasing analysis, in the joint planning 
construct. These researchers created a modeling and simulation that used 
sensitivity analysis, with varying degrees of utilization of proposed concepts, to 
demonstrate the efficacy of higher integrative planning concepts. The results 
were striking in that prior contract planning and integration utilizing specific 
concepts such as, spend analysis and creation of “ready” contracts, created a 
huge return in capability “effects” and reduction of cycle time response to the 
warfighter.    
The early planning phase parlayed terminology utilized by the warfighter 
and planning communities, aptly titled Phase Zero operations, that is, all planning 
and exercising that can and should occur before an actual real-world event or 
contingency crisis is manifest. The clear purpose and intent of this research is to 
provide a concept model that can guide planners and resource holders to create 
and utilize the recommended mix of personnel, platforms, and protocols to 
achieve better contracted effects, create efficiencies and effectiveness, and 
improve business operations across the full spectrum of war and peacetime 
operations.     
The concept development presented in this research report will meet the 
warfighters’ and the legislative requirements for improved integrative planning, 
and will be optimized to complement and best support the Unified Combatant 
Commander’s desired effects as iterated in the OPLANs and OPORDs. This is 
accomplished by incorporating a holistic approach including the right mix of 
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in the joint planning environment; and, the implementing, exercising, and full 
employment of forward-leaning protocols necessary for the creation of a sound 
business effect.  
C. Research Questions 
The primary research question is: How can the Yoder Three-tier Model 
and Joint Effects-based Contracting Execution Systems improve DoD and joint 
contingency contracting support planning processes? 
In order to answer the primary question, five subsidiary questions are 
posed, addressed, and answered: 
1. What current initiatives are targeted at improving joint contingency 
contract planning? 
2. What are the key elements of the Yoder Three-tier Model and the 
Joint Effects-based Contracting Execution System, and do they 
complement current initiatives?  
3. What primary pillars, or elements, are required for optimizing joint 
contingency contract planning? 
4. How can the Yoder Three-tier Model and the Joint Effects-based 
Contracting Execution System be integrated at the strategic 
planning level to optimize results? 
5. What policy implications are inherent if the research conclusions 
and recommendations are followed?   
D. Methodology and Scope 
I conducted a thorough and extensive literature review, utilized graduate 
student teams (i.e., working groups) to analyze doctrine and written policies, and 
capitalized on personal experience and imagination to develop this body of work 
and its concepts. A more detailed explanation of the methodology follows.  
I conducted a thorough and extensive examination and review of existing 
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Reports (Gansler, 2007; –CWCIA, 2009, Department of Defense directives and 
instructions, student theses and joint applied projects, sponsored research and 
working papers, Congressional Research Service reports, Government 
Accountability Office reports and testimony, and published documentation, slides, 
and reports from Joint and Service community planners, contracting experts, and 
practitioners.  
Additionally, two teams of graduate students were utilized to examine and 
provide critical assessment of “Phase Zero” operations (planning in advance of a 
real event) in respect to contingency contracting, including, but not limited to: (1) 
the Yoder Three-tier Model (Yoder, 2004); (2) the Joint Effects-based Contracting 
Execution System (Poree, et al., 2008a, 2008b); (3) Joint Publication 4-10 
(CJCS, 2008b); and (4) other pertinent referenced documents. Team 1 consisted 
of 19 uniformed officers from the Army and the Navy and international students 
enrolled in the Naval Postgraduate School’s MBA program. Team 1 was in their 
fifth program quarter (out of six total quarters) and enrolled in the MN3318 
Contingency Contracting course. The mix of Team 1 students ranked on average 
at the 0-3 to 0-4 level and about half of them had at least one prior tour in a 
contingency or expeditionary operational billet. Team 2 consisted of 15 students 
enrolled in the Master’s of Science in Contract Management (MSCM) curriculum 
in their sixth quarter of an eight-quarter program. This group predominantly 
consisted of Department of the Army civilian 1102 series contract specialists. A 
majority of these students were DAWIA Con Level II or III, with an average of 
seven years of experience in contracting positions.   
When either subject-matter experts or student teams were utilized, the 
DoD and NPS mandated that Institutional Review Board (IRB) protocols be 
followed to ensure full notification of the intent to use information gathered for 
research purposes and related compliance. All information gathered via contact 
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Based on the literature review, consultations, and student team analyses, 
the author created the framework and concept structure for Joint Effects-based 
Contracting and Phase Zero Operations, incorporating key pillars that the author 
considers essential for effective implementation: (1) personnel, (2) platforms, and 
(3) protocols for integrated planning and execution of contracting functions in 
OPLANs and OPORDs in harmony with the Unified Combatant Commander’s 
intent and effect.  
E. Terminology 
The author recognizes that many in the contracting community may not be 
well versed in the terminology associated with the joint warfighter community and 
vice versa. In that regard, every effort has been made to ensure that definitions 
are provided or that concepts are fully explained. The intent is to ensure that the 
research product is useful to planners, contracting experts, and warfighters, 
thereby increasing the potential utility of the work in shaping public policy and 
practices.   
F. Research Limitations 
The structure and presentation of this research is designed to provide 
information on the Joint planning process framework, on the background and 
premise of the Joint Effects-based Contracting (JEBC), and on Phase Zero 
operations as appropriate in order for the sponsor and readers to have a useful 
and meaningful concept for real-world integration and implementation into 
existing doctrine and practice. Utilization of existing platforms and processes are 
paramount because the intent is not to re-invent or change elements of the Joint 
Planning Process that are currently in place and working. The author developed 
concepts that rely on existing planning platforms and protocols while adding the 
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Limitations include those associated with concept development.  
Specifically, while the concepts were tested through simulation, they will still 
require actual implementation and refinement, a process that will naturally 
require additional commitment, dedication, time, and resources. Specific 
recommendations at the conclusion of this report will address these issues. 
G. Chapter Summary—Report Content  
This introduction and objectives chapter provided the background, 
purpose, methodology, and limitations of this sponsored research report.   
The following chapter, Chapter II, provides an overview of the Joint 
Planning environment with particular emphasis on recently introduced doctrine 
and policy, including Joint Publication 4-10 Operational Contracting Support, 
DoD Directive 3020.49 Orchestrating, Synchronizing, and Integrating Program 
Contract Support, and recent mandates to integrate contracting into the Joint 
Planning system, including title 10 U.S.C. section 2333 of the FY2008 Defense 
Authorization Act and its implications for contingency and expeditionary contract 
support planning and execution.   
Chapter III, Background and Premise of JEBC and Phase Zero, provides 
an overview of the Yoder Three-tier Model (YTTM) (Yoder, 2004), its 
incorporation in subsequent reports and recommendations, and its use as a 
building block for the next step in contract planning integration. Chapter III also 
includes key elements of the Joint Effects-based Contracting student MBA 
Acquisition Research Program project to demonstrate the potential gains from 
fully integrated planning and execution.     
Chapter IV, Integrating YTTM and Phase Zero, presents the required 
concept for integrating the personnel, platforms, and protocols effectively. 
Chapter V, Conclusions and Recommendations, provides the specific 
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and recommendations for an implementation strategy, imperative for policy 
makers, senior planners within joint and service planning, Unified Combatant 
Commanders (COCOMs), agencies and service components, and service 
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II. Joint Planning Environment—Calls for 
Integrative Planning 
This chapter provides a construct of the Joint Planning Environment and a 
review of key documents germane to this study. This information is important for 
those interested in placing the researcher’s model into the broader context of 
joint planning and execution.   
An extensive review of historical and recent literature was conducted with 
the objective of determining (1) historical backdrop; (2) recent and pertinent 
legislative, doctrinal, and operational references; and (3) current academic works 
related to integrative planning and exercising of phase zero operations.   
The primary sources of literature include, but are not limited to, (1) Joint 
Publications (doctrine), including Joint Publication 4-10 and Joint Publication 4-0; 
(2) Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports that highlight current 
initiatives and legislation and provide critical analysis; (3) Department of Defense 
(DoD) reports, directives, and instructions; (4) NPS joint applied projects; (5) 
NPS Acquisition Research Program sponsored research reports and working 
papers; (6) current website publications and postings from the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Staff, including J-4 (Joint Logistics), 
Army Contracting Command (ACC), the Naval Expeditionary Contracting 
Command (NECC), and other key Service-affiliated websites; and, (7) other key 
documents as referenced herein.1  
                                            
1 The author reviewed hundreds of relevant documents for this research, totaling over 4,000 
pages. Those with particular importance are referenced and/or cited herein and used for 
establishing the continuity and harmony of the research model against existing Federal 
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A. Mandates for Joint and Integrative Planning   
The formal requirement for joint planning is not new.  In fact, it dates back 
to the inception of the statutory mandate for Joint structure and command under 
the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.  The Goldwater-Nichols Department of 
Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Public Law 99-433, reworked the command 
structure of the United States military. It increased the powers of the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, implementing some of the suggestions from the Packard 
Commission formed by President Ronald Reagan in 1985. The statutory 
provision created joint billet coding, wherein Joint Professional Military Education 
(JPME) billets in key functional areas required personnel with joint credentials 
that had been attained through education and experience. The joint requirement, 
along with the structural changes that Goldwater-Nichols created via the Joint 
Command structure, revolutionized the way forces are structured, trained and 
exercised. However, the author contends that this requirement, in and of itself, 
did not guarantee that joint and integrative planning in the contracting arena 
occurred.   
Problems encountered in creating and executing comprehensive plans in 
contracting were manifest despite the Goldwater-Nichols Act.   
Operation Iraqi Freedom and the huge theater contracting effect that 
ensued had little, if any, joint and integrated contract planning in the early phases 
of the operation.2   
                                            
2 The author recommends the NPS joint applied project by Anderson and Flaherty (2003) for the 
examination of the Operation Iraqi Freedom Operation Plans (OPLANs) and other referenced 
works from the Government Accountability Office (2004, 2008, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2009d, 
2009e, 2009f, 2009g, 2010a, 2010b), Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) 
(?), the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (CWCIA-I/A) (2009), the 
“Gansler” Report (2007), etc., for a comprehensive examination of the negative effects of the lack 
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Congress, the GAO, and others have frequently reported on, or expressed 
concerns about, the long-standing challenges that the DoD faces when 
managing operational contract support. These challenges include a failure to 
adequately plan for the use of contractors, poorly defined or changing 
requirements, a lack of deployable contracting personnel with contingency 
contracting experience, and difficulties in coordinating contracts and contractor 
management across military Services in joint contingency environments. 
Furthermore, as previously stated, the DoD has not provided a sufficient number 
of trained contract oversight and management personnel in contingency 
operations, and visibility of contracting activities and contractors has been 
limited. As we have testified, problems associated with the DoD's inability to 
overcome these challenges have resulted in higher costs, schedule delays, 
unmet goals, and negative operational impacts. To respond to these concerns, 
Congress enacted an amendment to title 10 of the U.S. Code adding section 
2333, which directed the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop joint policies by April 2008 for requirements 
definition, contingency program management, and contingency contracting 
during combat and post-conflict operations. In January 2008, the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, hereafter referred to as the 
NDAA FY08, amended section 2333 to add a new subparagraph directing that 
these joint policies provide for the training of military personnel outside of the 
acquisition workforce who are expected to have acquisition responsibilities such 
as oversight of contracts or contractors during combat operations, post-conflict 
operations, and contingency operations. Additionally, NDAA FY08 directed the 
GAO to review the DoD's joint policies and determine the extent to which those 
policies and the implementation of such policies complied with the requirements 
of section 2333 of title 10 of the U.S. Code3 (GAO, 2008).   
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B. Joint Operation Planning Framework and Joint 
Doctrine 
Joint  doctrine publications and DoD directives and guidance have 
recently incorporated many changes to address contracting process integration, 
to include, but not limited to: Joint Publication 4-10, Operational Contract Support 
(CJCS, 2008b); DoD Directive 3020.49, Orchestrating, Synchronizing, and 
Integrating Program Management of Contingency Acquisition Planning and Its 
Operational Execution (USD[AT&L],2009), and GAO references highlighting title 
10 U.S.C. section 2333 of the FY2008 Defense Authorization Act, Overview and 
Implications for Contingency Operations. These documents, along with all other 
referenced materials, working groups, and the researcher’s professional and 
academic experiences, provide the analytical framework for placing the Yoder 
Three-tier Model and the Joint Effects-based Contracting System into a cohesive 
model for implementation across the Services and in the Joint Unified Combatant 
Command structure. 
Understanding the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System 
(JOPES) is essential for any practitioner, planner, contracting officer, or senior 
leader with a role in the design, planning, construct, exercise, and, ultimately, 
utilization of contracting for any joint operation.  And, quite frankly, most, if not all, 
modern operations have a joint requirement.  According to Richard W. Goodale, 
Jr., in “Planning for War: A System,” “planning must be visionary, quick, flexible, 
and adaptive. To achieve that end, we must understand the architecture of the 
planning system and on-going initiatives to improve” (1994).  
                                                                                                                                  
strategic doctrinal framework, service policies, and operational organization policies in place and 
in practice in order to address and overcome the identified deficiencies. A review of key elements 
is presented in this chapter. However, I contend that doctrinal and operational personnel, 
platform, and protocol shortfalls still exist that will sub-optimize and hinder the effective and 
efficient integrative planning for joint contracting operations, and propose in Chapters IV and V a 
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Joint Publication 5-0 (CJCS, 2006) entitled, Joint Operational Planning, is 
the overarching doctrine mandated for utilization by all Services and the Joint 
community.  Joint Publication 5-0 , along with the other Joint doctrine 
publications, including Joint Publication 4-0, Joint Logistics Planning (CJCS, 
2008a), and Joint Publication 4-10, Operational Contract Support (CJCS, 2008b) 
discussed subsequently, must be utilized in concert to achieve an integrated 
logistics and contracting support plan. These joint publications have all 
undergone recent revisions to reflect the need for more comprehensive 
examination and integration of doctrinal concepts aimed at providing a better 
support capability for operations. The recent rewriting of the Joint Publications, 
“reflects the current doctrine for conducting joint, interagency, and multinational 
planning activities across the full range of military operations. This vital keystone 
publication forms the core of joint warfighting doctrine and establishes the 
framework for our forces’ ability to fight as a joint team” (CJCS, 2006). 
All doctrine must be utilized as the overarching strategic framework for 
planning, force structuring, and process protocol. Joint doctrine, according to the 
Joint Chiefs’ and iterate, 
[Joint doctrine] applies to the Joint Staff; to commanders of Unified 
Combatant Commands, sub-unified commands, joint task forces, 
subordinate components of these commands, and combat support 
agencies; and to the Services. The guidance in this publication is 
authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the 
judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. 
If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents 
of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the 
other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and 
specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a 
multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow 
multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For 
doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders 
should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and 
procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and 
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Given the aforementioned mandate to follow joint doctrine for any doctrinal 
and/or procedural protocol, the researcher thoroughly examined current doctrine 
to ensure that the model constructs of the Yoder Three-tier Model, the Joint 
Effects-based Contracting and Execution System, and the main purpose of this 
research, creating the Phase Zero model, is harmonious with, and 
complementary to, established doctrine. For more in-depth information about the 
contextual framework, examine the referenced documents.  
C. Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) and the Joint 
Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES)—
Platform & Protocol Framework 
According to Joint Publication 5-0, “Joint operation planning includes all 
activities that must be accomplished to plan for an anticipated operation—the 
mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment of forces. Planners 
recommend and commanders define criteria for the termination of joint 
operations and establish criteria for attainment and achievement of the end state. 
Joint operation planning is an inherent command responsibility established by 
law and directive” (CJCS, 2006). This publication provides the doctrinal 
framework for all other activities related to joint operational planning. Within this 
construct, Joint Publication 5-0 states:  
The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and the 
Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) share the same basic approach 
and problem-solving elements, such as mission analysis and course of 
action development. The combination of JOPES and JOPP promotes 
coherent planning across all levels of war and command echelons, 
whether the requirement is for a limited, single-phase operation such as 
noncombatant evacuation or for a multiphase campaign involving high-
intensity combat operations. JOPES formally integrates the planning 
activities of the entire JPEC during the initial planning and plan refinement 
that occurs both in peacetime and when faced with an imminent crisis. 
While JOPES activities span many organizational levels, the focus is on 
the interaction which ultimately helps the President and Sec Def decide 
when, where, and how to commit US military capabilities in response to a 
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proven analytical process, which provides a methodical approach to 
planning at any organizational level and at any point before and during 
joint operations. The focus of JOPP is on the interaction between an 
organization’s commander, staff, the commanders and staffs of the next 
higher and lower commands, and supporting commanders and their staffs 
to develop a joint operation plan (OPLAN) or operation order (OPORD) for 
a specific mission. (CJCS, 2006) 
 
Figure 1. Overview of Joint Operation Planning (CJCS, 2006)  
JOPES, in essence, provides the platform and associated protocols 
required for its employment and for the integration of strategic, operational, and 
tactical elements in the planning, exercising, and execution of complex military 
operations. It is also the network of systems and people required to coordinate all 
the efforts in peacetime and wartime environments. JOPES can be viewed as the 
heart of the “system” utilized in the joint planning community, as evidenced in 
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D. Joint Publication 4-10, Operational Contract Support 
Joint Publication 4-10 entitled Operational Contract Support (CJCS, 2008)  
created doctrine designed to address many of the shortcomings associated with 
a lack of comprehensive strategic-level contracting doctrine prior to its 
publication. Additionally, it fulfilled an essential statutory mandate under title 10 
U.S.C. section 2333, as was discussed earlier. Joint Publication 4-10 established 
doctrine for planning, conducting, and assessing operational contract support 
integration and contractor management functions in support of joint operations, 
and it provides standard guidance and information related to integrating 
operational contract support and contractor management (CJCS, 2008b).   
Joint Publication 4-10 created the doctrinal, strategic-level concept, and 
promotes Operational Contract Support (OCS), which is “the process of planning 
for and obtaining supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources 
in support of joint operations along with the associated contractor management 
functions.  Successful operational contract support is the ability to orchestrate 
and synchronize the provision of integrated contract support and management of 
contractor personnel providing that support” (CJCS, 2008b). Like much of U.S. 
doctrine, OCS under Joint Publication 4-10 calls for centralized planning with 
decentralized control.   
The doctrine created under Joint Publication 4-10 emphasizes a key role 
for Unified Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) in relation to integrated planning 
and assigns unique functional roles and responsibilities to the joint staff codes 
under joint authority. Figure 3 provides an excerpt from Joint Publication 4-10 
that gives specific guidance on this subject.4  
                                            
4 Joint Publication 4-10 creates flow-down doctrinal responsibilities in addition to the CCDRs 
listed in Figure 4. However, for the purposes of my model creation and presentation, the CCDR, 









Figure 3. Excerpt from Joint Publication 4-10 
(CJCS, 2008b, pp. II-8–II-9)
                                                                                                                                  
discussion. Readers are encouraged to examine Joint Publication 4-10 in detail for a greater 
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The doctrine also creates uniquely identified service component functions 
that must be examined in concert with the roles of the CCDRs.  Figure 4 is an 









Figure 4. Excerpt from Joint Publication 4-10 
(CJCS, 2008b, pp. II-10, II-11) 
Joint Publication 4-10 integrated two key and instrumental agencies into 
the doctrine: the Defense Contract Management Agency and the Defense 
Contract Audit Agency. This integration, in addition to creating the strategic 
framework for creation of the Contracting Support Integration Plan (discussed in 
Chapter IV), was monumental at creating the strategic framework required to fully 
integrate contracting into operation plans and in the conduct of business across 
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E.  DoD Directive 3020.49, Orchestrating, Synchronizing, 
and Integrating Program Management of Contingency 
Acquisition Planning and Its Operational Execution 
In a monumental step towards better contract planning integration, DoD 
published  DoD Directive 3020.49 (USD[AT&L], 2009), establishing the policy 
and assigned the responsibilities for program management for the preparation 
and execution of acquisitions for contingency operations. This directive further 
stipulates that all DoD service components be in full compliance with statutory 
and doctrinal requirements under the aforementioned statutes. As the directive 
title clearly states, the service components must perform the orchestration, 
synchronization, and integration of programmatic and systems contractual 
support within operations plans (USD[AT&L], 2009, para. 4[d]). In other words,  
all weapons systems that will be deployed for military operations must have an 
integrated contract support plan,5 fully integrated and synchronized with the 
operations’ plan time phasing.6 
                                            
5 The OCS integrated support plan is now required as Annex W to all OPLANs and OPORDs.   
6 The author notes that throughout 2009 and 2010, program offices contacted for this research 
effort had been engaged in developing the comprehensive contract requirements specifically 
driven by this requirement. Additionally, Operational Contract Support (OCS) has gained 
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III. Premise of the Yoder Three-Tier Model and 
Joint Effects-Based Contracting Execution 
System (JEBCES) and Phase Zero 
This chapter provides the background and premise of the Joint Effects-based 
Contracting concept and Phase Zero operations. The primary objective of this 
research is to integrate the Yoder Three-tier Model (Yoder, 2004) and the Joint 
Effects-based Contracting concepts originally proposed by NPS students and 
published as an MBA joint applied project and an NPS Acquisition Research 
sponsored research report (Poree et al., 2008a, 2008b) in a sound strategic and 
operational construct model for senior executives, planners, practitioners, and policy 
makers. Therefore, a review of the aforementioned research works is necessary.  
Those desiring a more comprehensive look at those products are encouraged to 
review them.7   
A. Yoder Three-Tier Model (YTTM) 
The Yoder Three-tier Model (YTTM) was originally published as a Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) Acquisition Research Program (ARP) working paper 
(Yoder, 2004) and is still available from the Acquisition Research Program’s website 
(www.acquisitionresearch.org). This  working paper was created following the 
author’s publication in the Army AL&T magazine, which called for a better structure 
for planning and executing contingency contracting operations (AL&T Magazine, 
2004). In order to satisfy calls from senior leadership, operational managers, and 
practitioners  for a more comprehensive development of the concept presented in 
the Army AL&T magazine article, the author published the YTTM as part of the NPS 
working paper series. The working paper has two sections. Section one is the basic 
                                            
7 It should be noted that under this current research effort, and based on the significant amount of 
analysis conducted in the preparation of this report, some changes to those original works are 
recommended by the author and are presented herein. Specific changes are clearly stated within this 
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premise of contingency contracting and its unique contextual elements. Section two 
is the presentation of the YTTM itself.  The layout of the document is as follows:  
Section One: The Unique Contingency Contracting Requirement  
I. Contract Definition 
II. Functions of a Contract  
III. Contingency Contract Definition  
IV. Real-world Examples (taken from up to and including the 2004 
publication date) 
Section Two: The Contingency Contracting Officer Yoder Three-tier Model  
I.  Calls for Better Planning and Coordination  
II. The Yoder Three-tier Model for Contingency Contracting:  
A.  Ordering Officer Model   
B.  Leveraging Contracting Officer Model  
C.  Integrated Planner and Executor Model  
III.  Moving from Theory to Practice—The “Who Cares” Test  
In the working paper, the author proposed three models of employment for 
contingency contracting officers. Each tier performs unique functions and requires 
specific education, developed skill sets, and unique personnel and manpower 
characteristics. Each tier is co-dependent, or integrated in a hierarchal manner, on 
the other tiers. The Yoder Three-tier Model maximizes the effectiveness and the 
efficiency of theater contingency contracting operations and directly links operations 
to the Unified Combatant Commander (COCOM) broad objectives through 
integrative planning and execution (Yoder, 2004). 
1.  Tier One: Ordering Officer Model.  The most basic and simplistic model 
is the “ordering officer” model. This model is the most rudimentary of contracting 
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contracts.  By nature, this model requires little interactive engagement with the 
environment and is best suited for warranted junior officers and enlisted personnel.    
2.  Tier Two: Leveraging Contracting Officer (LCO) Model.  The next level 
in the model is the “leveraging contracting officer” model. This level includes the 
basic ordering functions of the ordering officer model, but it includes leveraging the 
capacities and capabilities of the local and regional economies in the contingent 
theater. As a result, there may be a reduced need for organic service and material 
support. The practitioner in the leveraging model clearly will be engaged in 
interfacing with local and regional businesses, in creating business processes, and 
in potentially coordinating with higher military personnel, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), and private volunteer organizations (PVOs) and with political 
organizations. With this in mind, only more qualified and capable practitioners should 
perform in the leverage model. A shortfall of this model is that the contingency 
contracting officer (CCO) operation may or may not be integrated with the broader 
goals of national and theater objectives. In the worst case, some of the tactical 
execution may actually be counter productive to those higher level goals.    
3.  Tier Three: The Integrated Planner and Executor (IPE) Model.  The 
highest-level model is the “Integrated Planner and Executor” (IPE) contingency 
contracting officer. This model takes the leveraging contracting officer function one 
giant step forward. In this model, well-educated and qualified CCOs are integrated 
into the operational-planning phases of contingencies, often before actual troop 
deployment; they then make the transition to operations. The hallmark of the IPE 
CCO is that contingency contracting operations may be planned and subsequently 
executed to meet national strategic and theater objectives. Additionally, the myriad 
NGOs and PVOs—which, in many if not most cases, are essential to the overall 
efficiency, effectiveness, and, ultimately, the success of operations—can be 
integrated into the planning and execution of contingency operations. While this 
integration requirement may seem painfully obvious, the integrated planning and 
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PVOs is not, and it does not occur on a regular and recurring basis. The author 
proposes that the IPE CCO be utilized in a broader planning-and-execution 
environment. The CCO with higher level certification, education, and experience, 
should be integrated within the J-4 and J-5 Logistics and Planning/Operations and 
Exercise organization structure. Integration is essential to achieving the desired 
synergies between the myriad organizations involved in and participating in 
contingency environments.  Concurrently, operational planners can leverage 
integration of all theater players (military, NGOs/PVOs, and contractors) to achieve 
harmony between National Security Strategy (NSS), Unified Combatant Commander 
(COCOM), and NGOs’ and PVOs’ objectives through integrated planning, 
exercising, and, ultimately, execution. This integrative planning, exercising, and 
execution may (1) help eliminate the competing (and often conflicting) demands of 
the participants, (2) closely marry acquisition support with stated objectives, (3) allow 
for the creation of robust Contingency Contract Support Plans, and (4) integrate 
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Figure 5.  Calls for Better Planning and Coordination – Integrated  
Planner and Executor (IPE) Model 
(Yoder, 2004) 
The true heart of the model in Figure 5 is portrayed in Table 1 as it originally 
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Table 1. Yoder Three-Tier Model for Contingency Contracting Operations 
 
B. The YTTM Conclusions and Recommendations  
The Yoder Three-tier Model addresses a significant shortfall in current 
contingency contracting operation support: integrative planning and execution. As is 
demonstrated in the Anderson and Flaherty (2003) project, comprehensive planning 
in the joint environs of the Unified Combatant Commander’s J-4 (logistics) and J-5 
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degree. Instead, what the acquisition and contracting community is providing the 
COCOM is sub-optimized.  
The Yoder Three-tier Model calls for the cultivation and utilization of senior 
officers and civilians with sufficient education, joint qualification, multi-discipline 
Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) certifications, and other 
professional qualifications to perform at the highest integrative-planning and 
execution levels. At the highest level, the Integrative Planner and Executor (IPE) is 
the essential and critical linchpin, allowing for the development of a comprehensive 
Contingency Contracting Support Plan (CCSP) that integrates contracting with the 
broader theater objectives in the Operation Plan (OPLAN).   
The IPE, being integrated at the J-4 level, will plan, exercise, and call for 
adequate theater contingency contracting personnel provisioning (which may vary 
depending on the phases of the contingency operation) to effectively and efficiently 
meet theater objectives.    
The primary recommendation is that the Yoder Three-tier Model be reviewed 
and implemented across all Services. In order to effectively accomplish this 
implementation, the author recommends that senior leadership, including the 
secretariat level, take pro-active measures to implement the model. Such review and 
implementation considerations include the following:  
 Mandate that the Services implement the Yoder Three-tier Model;  
 Fully fund educational and career-development programs, which are 
the hallmark of the Integrated Planner and Executor (IPE) and the 
Leveraging Contracting Officer (LCO);    
 Ensure that the Services create career incentives for personnel 
choosing to take positions in support of the Yoder Three-tier Model;  
 Mandate that the J-4 structure include the IPE, top-level integrative 
planner and executor; and  
 Mandate that personnel at the IPE and LCO model levels achieve Joint 
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C. The Yoder Three-Tier Model Gains Traction in the Broader 
Community  
The Yoder Three-tier Model, subsequent to its original publication, was cited 
and/or referenced in several studies and commission reports. The author attributes 
the success in large part, to the efforts of the staff at the Acquisition Research 
Program at the Naval Postgraduate School who championed the work. Among the 
works that reference or cite the model are the Report of the Commission on Army 
Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations (Gansler, 2007), 
and the July 2006 Special Inspector General Report for Iraq Reconstruction: 
Lessons in Contracting and Procurement (SIGIR, 2006). The model was also 
presented at the 2005 Acquisition Research Symposium sponsored by the Naval 
Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.  
Of particular significance is the Gansler Report. The tier structure 
recommended in the YTTM was adopted by the Gansler Report in late 2007, and 
subsequently has become the tier structure authorized by Congress for the Army 
Contracting Command commissioned in early 2008. The YTTM structure, embedded 
in the overarching recommendations in the Gansler Report, became the foundation 
that authorized and created a position equivalent to two stars and its associated 
lower tiers for the Army Contracting Command.    
D. YTTM Summary and Implications for this Phase Zero 
Research  
The YTTM tackled a most critical issue in the broader context of integrative 
planning—lack of credentialed personnel and lack of actual defined positions within 
the existing joint planning environment. This is the personnel aspect of the key 
elements defined in this research work: personnel, platforms, and protocols.  
Additionally, the YTTM, shown in the body of Table 1, provided the basic elements 
of protocols, or what should be done, and, in a very basic sense and to a lesser 
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E. Yoder Three-Tier Model as a Building Block for Additional 
Research and the Joint Effects-Based Contracting and 
Execution System (JEBCES)  
The YTTM was, and is, a concept model. As such, it lends itself to further 
analysis, analytical review, refinement, and development. Subsequent to its 
publication, Naval Postgraduate School MBA students utilized the basic framework 
proposed in the YTTM and conducted the aforementioned analysis, analytical 
review, refinement, and development as their MBA joint applied project. 
Concurrently, the framework of the model was used in an Acquisition Research 
Program student thesis (which was advised by this author and Dr. Rene Rendon), 
entitled, The Joint Effects-Based Contracting Execution System: A Proposed 
Enabling Concept for Future Joint Expeditionary Contracting Execution, previously 
referred to as the JEBCES (Poree et al., 2008a, 2008b). Three of the student 
researchers were graduates of the United States Air Force Academy, and one of 
them was a graduate of the United States Naval Academy; all of them graduated 
from the NPS MBA program.  
F. The Joint Effects-Based Contracting Execution System 
(JEBCES): A Proposed Enabling Concept for Future Joint 
Expeditionary Contracting Execution  
1. JEBCES Overview.  
The JEBCES took several concepts explored in the NPS MN3318 
Contingency Contracting course, in which the students were enrolled, along with the 
YTTM, and several innovative business and warfighter tools and applications 
heretofore not examined or applied in the particular context of attempting to achieve 
a better integrated approach to contingency and expeditionary planning and 
execution.  According to the abstract in the JEBCES project, its purpose was:  
“to deliver a concept enabling joint effects-based contracting (EBC) execution 
throughout all of the following phases of the Unified Combatant Commander’s 
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stabilizing and enabling (Phases 0-V), respectively.  Under the enabling civil 
authority phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the Commanding General 
of the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC–I/A) pioneered 
effects-based contracting (EBC) to align tactical contracting efforts with the 
strategic objectives of the OIF campaign plan.  The JCC–I/A accomplished 
this by integrating contingency contracting officers (CCOs) with the 
warfighters’ operational planning cycles, linking contracting efforts with 
desired strategic operational effects, and prioritizing contracting work based 
on the warfighters’ main efforts.” (Poree et al., 2008a, 2008b) 
This project applied EBC methodologies and the systems engineering 
process to introduce the framework for the Joint Effects-based Contracting 
Execution System (JEBCES)—an integrated composite of people, products, and 
processes to deliver an acquisition capability. Within this framework, the researchers 
proposed a Phase-based Acquisition Capability (PBAC) to enable forward-leaning, 
responsive joint expeditionary contract support. This framework emphasized 
providing future CCOs with a pre-awarded, rapidly deployable acquisition capability, 
thereby creating greater uniformity and efficiency in joint EBC execution” (Poree et. 
al., 2008a). 
2. JEBCES Construct #1: Phasing Harmony and Synchronization 
with Spend Analysis. 
JEBCES utilized Arena 10.0 Forward Business Solutions by Rockwell 
Software, Inc., to model and simulate discrete events in order to create a Phased-
based Acquisition Capability (PBAC) that placed the right contracted support at the 
right time and place and to create a desired effect—hence the concept of Effects-
based Contracting (EBC) and the Joint Effects-based Contracting Execution System 
(JEBCES). The research utilized actual Operation Iraqi Freedom spend data to 
understand the nature of goods and services required for the operation, at specific 
time phases or milestones of the operation. Then the researchers linked the time-
phased spend data to traditional contracting phases, as explained in the Yoder 
Three-tier Model and recognized by the broader contingency and expeditionary 
contracting communities, and compared it against the war planner’s and warfighter’s 
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Traditionally, the contingency and expeditionary contracting community has 
defined four phases of contracting in support of military operations. Phase 1 is the 
initial deployment of forces in response to an event requiring the utilization of the 
military. Phase 2 is the build-up, wherein a capability is grown through introduction of 
more forces. Phase 3 is the sustainment phase, wherein operations are maintained 
and/or matured. Phase 4 is the redeployment of forces, or in other words, the 
termination of the operations.8  
The warfighting community utilizes a different phasing system, as was 
presented and analyzed in the JEBCES report. Phase 1 is the deter phase, deterring 
potential enemy action. Phase 2 is seizing the initiative and includes the initial 
buildup of military personnel and equipment while concurrently posturing for kinetic 
events. Phase 3 is the dominate phase, including the full employment and utilization 
of forces with the intent of dominating and controlling the operational environment. 
Phase 4 is the stabilize phase, marking the end of the dominant phase while 
creating the framework for the desired end-state. Phase 5 is the enable civil 
authority phase, enabling the political, economic, and security structures to enact the 
desired end state.  
The JEBCES report analyzed the plans and actual spend data of the 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) campaign across all commodity groups and 
categorized them according to which phase of the contracting and military operation 
phase that the commodity was acquired.   
3. JEBCES Construct #2: Effects-Based Contracting (EBC). 
Effects-based Contracting (EBC) was pioneered by the Commanding General 
of the Joint Contracting Command–Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC–I/A) in an effort to align 
                                            
8 A thorough discussion of the traditional four phases as defined by the contingency and 
expeditionary communities may be found in the Yoder Three-tier Model (Yoder, 2004). It should be 
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contracting efforts with the campaign plans. The EBC concept was promoted as 
coordinating contracting resources and capabilities in time, space, and purpose.  
The key tenant of EBC is to integrate contracting early in the planning process in the 
appropriate time and space in order to complement the five warfighter phases 
defined earlier. The EBC concept relies on five key components to be successful:  
1. Developing a concept of support, 
2. Identifying key players, 
3. Knowing the warfighters’ battle rhythm, 
4. Ensuring visibility by being in the right planning evolution, and 
5. Having flexibility within the enterprise. (Poree et al., 2008a, p. 15–16) 
The student JEBCES project examined JCC–I/A business operations in 
concert with the key components identified above as part of their effort to validate 
the EBC concepts. According to the JEBCES authors, the utilization of EBC was 
successful, but the expected benefits—getting the right contracted support at the 
right place and right time and in harmony with the warfighters’ phasing—did not fully 
manifest itself. The researchers’ analysis demonstrated that the integrative planning 
occurred in the later phases of the warfighters’ operations, and hence, was 
suboptimized.  
4. JEBCES Construct #3: Marrying the YTTM to EBC. 
The JEBCES researchers, recognizing the merits of the EBC concept and the 
degree of success in OIF, albeit suboptimized success, married the Yoder Three-tier 
Model (YTTM) construct to the phasing and spend data from Operation Iraqi 
Freedom (OIF). JEBCES used the key Integrated Planner and Executor tier of the 
YTTM, the highest levels of strategic planning, and modeled assuming varying rates 
of utilization of this position in combination with spend analysis data.  Then JEBCES 
synchronized the data with the warfighters’ phasing and mapped out scenarios that 
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The effects were examined as to the ability to acquire and field the rights goods and 
services required, at the right place and right time, complementing the warfighters’ 
desired effect.  
JEBCES proved that utilizing the YTTM IPE tier while incorporating historical 
spend analysis to create and execute the support plans for emerging operational 
requirements provided significant improvements—particularly when done in the 
earliest phases of the operation, and ideally when done prior to the manifestation of 
an actual military requirement.    
5. JEBCES Conclusions and Recommendations. 
The JEBCES authors derived three conclusions from their research and 
provided four recommendations.9   
Conclusion 1: Transforming the Contractual Requirements from 
Operations. The transformation of the contractual requirements from operations 
(i.e., the spend analysis) into a PBAC improves joint expeditionary execution.  
Combining YTTM tiers (personnel), performing strategic spend analysis, and 
creating mission oriented contract support, allows for a significant reduction in the 
total contractual response time. Under the PBAC JEBCES system, standardizing 
10% of the commodity purchase requests decreased total system time by 12.2%. 
Additionally, if operational customers are willing to standardize requirements at the 
75% level, they can realize a 76% reduction in cycle-time.   
Conclusion 2: JEBCES Provides the Framework for the DoD to Better 
Align Funding to Enable Responsive Contract Support. In an effort to align 
funding with phase-related activities, the Federal Acquisition Regulation provides for 
bulk funding, whereby the CO receives authorization from a fiscal and accounting 
                                            
9 The author of this research has rephrased the JEBCES original conclusions and recommendations 
for clarity and conciseness because the original JEBCES wording didn’t lend itself to a clear 
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officer to obligate funds on purchase documents against a specified lump sum of 
funds. If a high percentage of requirements are standardized, then phase-based 
demand data should be used to effectively and efficiently deliver supplies and 
services to the warfighter in proper time phasing.  Funding, aligned with forecasted 
requirements, can provide for transparency and fund accountability.   
Conclusion 3: JEBCES Enables Efficient and Effective Use of Limited 
CCO Resources. JEBCES demonstrated the efficacy of the Yoder Three-tier Model 
concept. The analysis clearly indicated that properly using the Yoder Three-tier 
Model (YTTM) Integrated Planner and Executor (IPE), the top strategic-level tier of 
the YTTM and working in harmony with the lower tiers greatly enhanced the 
capability of the Phased-based Acquisition Capability (PBAC). Thus, it created the 
effects desired and required by the warfighter as well as the synchronization with 
time and location specified in the operations plans; it also achieved greater 
effectiveness and efficiencies, as measured by reduced cycle-times and fewer 
required personnel.  
Based on these conclusions, the JECBES researchers made four 
recommendations.  
Recommendation 1: Design a Deployable Information Technology (IT) 
Solution to Integrate Contracting at the Theater Tier. Along with a PBAC, the IT 
system would be used at all tiers to perform the various functions that would be 
required in a contingency arena. The IT system should enable central contracts to 
be used at remote locations, which in turn would empower the strategic tier to 
analyze and make command decisions on requirement fulfillment options. A design 
attribute of a centralized IT system is making contracting activities more transparent 
and accountable. This could be conducted concurrently with a spend analysis (see 
Recommendation 2).  
Recommendation 2: Conduct a Spend Analysis. Decision makers should 
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and type of contingency that planning is being conducted for. The area should be 
delegated and defined by the appropriate CCDR. The CCDR would be responsible 
for determining what would be available in theater and what reach-back capabilities 
would be needed appropriate to the phase. The size of the contingency should be 
compared to past events that are similar in size and type as appropriate.  
Recommendation 3: Develop a Pre-Awarded Rapid Acquisition 
Capability. By developing a pre-awarded rapid acquisition capability such as a 
Multiple Award Indefinite Delivery based on the CP spend analysis, future CCOs 
would be provided the means to enter into Phase Zero shaping, with rapidly 
executable capability.  Additionally, at the operational level, further improvement of 
EBC methodologies was recommended.  
Recommendation 4: Develop a Strategic Contracting Plan. Once a spend 
analysis and a concept of operations are developed, a strategic contracting plan 
would need to be drawn up. This would be the time when theater-wide contracts 
could be competed.  As per the CCDR’s analysis, the needed reach-back 
contracting could be put into place to have the appropriate resources available when 
needed. Tier III contracting officers are appropriate for this tier of contracting, and 
these contracts would be placed into the deployable IT solution for use in a 
contingency environment. When a contingency does occur, dependent on the 
magnitude, an appropriate manning plan would be developed based upon the 
existing available theater contracts. This is when the true benefit of the PBAC would 
be realized. Currently there is low use of lower tier contracting officers and overuse 
of higher tier contracting officers. The deployment of contracting officers would be 
appropriate to fit the tier of contracting needs for an area instead of to fit what is 
available at the time.   
More experienced contracting officers would be relieved of high-volume 
routine-items that are available on theater-wide contracts. This relief would then 
enable them to meet potentially complex requirements experienced once kinetic, or 
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6. JEBCES Summary and Implications for This Phase Zero 
Research. 
The JEBCES report tackled several critical issues in the broader context of 
integrative planning—validating the YTTM tier structure for placing credentialed 
personnel within the planning and execution framework (the personnel aspect) and 
calling for and validating through modeling and simulation (some of the protocol 
aspects), including conducting strategic spend analyses and phasing the contract 
and purchase spend in harmony and synchronous with the warfighters’ operation 
schema. This complements the key elements defined in this research work: 
personnel, platforms, and protocols.  
G. Chapter Summary 
This chapter provided the background and premise of the Yoder Three-tier 
Model (YTTM) and the Joint Effects-based Contracting Execution System 
(JEBCES);  it also explained the model’s potential gains in terms of the efficiency 
and effectiveness of having the right people with the right credentials properly placed 
in the organization (personnel) and ensuring that those people are employing the 
correct protocols to ensure proper harmony with the warfighters’ operations schema 
and plan phasing (protocol).   
However, to properly capitalize on these concepts, they must be integrated 
into doctrine and policies to ensure that the personnel, protocols, and platforms are 
fully institutionalized. It is the full integration and implementation into doctrine, policy, 
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IV. Integrating YTTM & JEBCES in Phase Zero  
A. Introduction 
This chapter proposes and provides the conceptual models for fully 
integrating contingency and expeditionary contract planning in the joint environment.  
It’s been demonstrated in previous chapters that there has been a significant amount 
of forward movement in doctrine, directives, and practice, particularly since 2008, a 
thorough review of the doctrine, directives, and practice reveals that currently, there 
is no single integrative model or framework fully embracing all of the elements 
necessary for successful integrative planning. This chapter will define and expand 
on those elements considered imperative for integrative contract planning in the joint 
environment; it also answers subsidiary research questions three (What primary 
pillars, or elements, are required for optimizing joint contingency contract planning?) 
and four (How can the Yoder Three-tier Model and the Joint Effects-based 
Contracting Execution System be integrated at the strategic planning level to 
optimize results?).  
In order to answer subsidiary research question four, five “universal” 
questions must be addressed. Those questions are as follows:   
1. Who must be involved in planning at the strategic level? 
2. Where within the organizational structure must individuals be 
positioned and conduct planning?   
3. What must strategic contingency and expeditionary contract planners 
accomplish?  
4. When must strategic planning take place? 
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B. Key Pillars for Integrative Success: Personnel, Platforms, 
Protocols  
Three key pillars imperative for integrative planning success—personnel, 
platforms, and protocols. Without all three pillars working in harmony, the 
contracting, planning, and associated support provided to the warfighter will be 
suboptimized. Suboptimization will result in lost efficiencies and effectiveness and, at 
worst, may act to subvert the COCOM objectives. Embedded within the three pillars 
are key enabling elements, which were discussed separately in Chapters II and III, 
including the JOPES system, the Joint Doctrine framework, the Yoder Three-tier 
Model, the JEBCES report, and associated publications, see figure 4 below. 
 
Figure 6. Integrating the Yoder Three-Tier Model and Phase Zero Operations: 
Mandatory Pillars for Integrative Success  
Within the personnel pillar is the YTTM governing the critical link between 
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people with the right skill sets in the right positions within the organizational 
framework.10 The protocols—defined as the rules, decision-making framework, and 
business models employed—are the complex set of logic-based systems that allow 
business operations to follow sound practices. The platforms are those hardware 
and tangible software systems that provide the mechanisms for analysis, decision 
making, and communication.  
C. Addressing Universal Questions of Integration  
Answering the five universal questions of who, where, what, when, and why 
provides the required comprehensive view of the answer to subsidiary research 
question four, —How can the Yoder Three-tier Model and the Joint Effects-based 
Contracting Execution System be integrated at the strategic planning level to 
optimize results? 
1. Question 1:  Who must be involved in planning at the strategic 
level?   
The answer to this question is provided in the Yoder Three-tier Model at the 
Integrated Planner and Executor (IPE) tier. The IPE is the highest level and requires 
the highest credentialed personnel in the YTTM model. The credential is imperative 
for the success of the position holder and for the accomplishment of the functions 
described in answer to the subsequent questions and their associated answers, in 
other words, the capability.  The IPE is a top-tier planner, coordinator, and executor. 
As such, the IPE must hold DAWIA CON Level III and other complementary DAWIA 
certifications, such as logistics, acquisition, finance, etc., which will strengthen his or 
her credential and capability. All IPEs must have a Master’s degree or higher, 
preferably within contracting, business, or a related field. In addition, and of 
particular importance, the IPE is required to be fully Joint Professional Military 
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Education (JPME) Phase I and II credentialed. The rank or position of the IPE 
should be limited to senior military officers, O-6 or above, and/or senior civilians at 
the GS-13+ or SES level. Those in the IPE position should also have key experience 
components in contracting, business operations, joint billets.  If the IPE is a civilian, 
vice military, a joint civilian position in operational or strategic level planning and 
operations and/or joint contracting and/or logistics—diversity and depth should be 
strongly considered.11   
Table 2. Credential of the Integrated Planner and Executor (IPE) 
Credential 
Category 
Credential Description  
(Desired Attributes) 
Education/Degree Master’s degree(s) or higher.  Preference for degrees in 
contracting, business disciplines, and military strategy.  
Multiple degrees an asset.  
Joint Qualification JPME Phase I and II.   
Security 
Clearance 
Top Secret (based on mission—may be 
compartmentalized) or Secret, minimum.  
DAWIA 
Certifications 
CON Level III mandatory with LOG, FIN, ACQ, and PMT 




Military rank of O-6 or higher.  
Civilian grade GS-13 or higher.   
SES preferable.  
Experience & 
Tour History 
Combined experience to include: contracting, joint 
planning, business operations, logistics, and financial 
management.   
Concentration in contracting most desired along with 
joint tour or position experience.  
 
                                            
11 The reader should be cognizant of the force structure implications with the credentialed IPE.  Force 
structure, career and billet/position management, education, and training are all affected by the 
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2. Question 2:  Where must IPEs be placed, and where must 
planning be conducted?  
 Ideally, the IPE, being the highest level planner and executor, should reside 
within the Unified Combatant Command (COCOM) staff. The individual Services 
normally provide uniformed officers for joint billet assignment within COCOMs, 
whereas civilians may be more permanently assigned within the COCOM. Working 
groups who participated in this research indicated that within current planning 
structures at the COCOMs, there were not enough credentialed personnel meeting 
the IPE criteria, and for those with some of the credentials, they were often military 
officers with limited billet duration. Additionally, the officers were assigned to 
COCOM and Joint Planning positions on a temporary, short-term basis, and often 
were of much lower rank or position than the YTTM IPE requirement calls for. 
Having no IPE resulted in a capability gap that hindered the integrative analytical 
capability that the IPE is particularly designed to address.  Because the individual 
Services assign uniformed officers to Joint staff positions, and because those same 
Services are the warrant authority providers (through flow-down authority), the 
Services must create the credentialed billets and career progression to ensure 
credentialed personnel are in the pipeline to fill critical joint billets designated with 
IPE credential.12   
In addition to COCOM staff, IPE-credentialed personnel must be embedded 
and working within any strategic J-4 Logistics staff and/or associated Army G-4 and 
Navy N-4 staff elements, and wherever Operational Contacting Support groups are 
planning and executing the higher level strategic plan integration and 
synchronization. This provision will also allow for the IPE to be groomed and to be 
capable of integrating across Services into the joint environment and vice versa.  
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It is imperative to place the IPE in a position long enough to complete at least 
one, and preferably more than one, full planning and exercising cycle. As the 
research working groups indicated, most often personnel who were in positions 
roughly approximate to what is being proposed as the IPE have been in place for 
less than a full planning and exercise cycle. Consequently, there has been 
insufficient continuity to allow for detailed and proper functioning in the areas, which 
are described below. 
3. Question 3:  What must the IPE strategic planner accomplish?   
The IPE must be credentialed and experienced to effectively accomplish 
myriad tasks for effective and efficient joint contingency contract planning and 
execution. Some of the most critical tasks and functions include, but are not limited 
to those presented and discussed in the following paragraphs.   
a. OPLAN and CONPLAN Review and Analysis.   
The IPE must be able to conduct a comprehensive analysis and assessment 
of COCOM and/or service-component Operations Plans and Concept of Operations 
Plans. This analysis is imperative in order to ensure that any associated Contract 
Support Integration Plan (CSIP) or Contingency Contracting Support Plan (CCSP) 
can complement and enhance the desired effect and end-state objectives of the 
broader plan.13 Assessment and analysis of the OPLAN and CONPLAN should 
include all engineering plans (provided by joint engineering planners), Time-Phased 
Force & Deployment Data (TPFDD) modeling and movement plans, supporting and 
supported elements and their associated static and mobilization plans, and a host of 
other elements embedded in sound planning documents. Without a comprehensive 
assessment and analysis of the broader elements of the COCOM and Service plans, 
                                            
13 CSIP and CCSPs are the OPLAN and CONPLAN documents created and designed to provide all 
contract supporting elements that are necessary to achieve the OPLAN objectives. Basic CSIP/CCSP 
plan content areas are provided in Annex X. This chapter discusses the functions of the IPE, not the 
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any associated contracting plans may, and in most cases will, be suboptimized and 
may actually work contrary to the overarching plan. 
4. Operation Schema and Objective Analysis. 
Closely related to the overarching OPLAN and CONPLAN analysis is 
operation schema and objective analysis. The schema and objective represent the 
primary mode and nature of the forces utilized to accomplish the mission, and the 
objective is the end-state desired, including those at specific phases of the 
operation. Often times, the schema and objectives shift when entering different 
phases of military operations. Hence, the IPE strategic planner and executor must 
have plans that complement the pace and synchronization of the overall plan.  
Effective contract provisioning of goods and services should work to enhance the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the overarching force. The IPE must ascertain the 
order of battle and the scheme and develop courses of action (COA) for use in 
planning OPLANs and OPORDs—the actual order to execute a specific OPLAN with 
any required modifications for a current crisis. As emphasized earlier, without the 
proper credential, the IPE may not have the capability to examine the OPLAN and 
CONPLAN with the understanding required to complement it with a sound CSIP or 
CCSP.  
a. Stakeholder Analysis and Integration. 
 Stakeholder analysis that uses a sound analytical approach such as SWOT 
(Strength, Weakness, Opportunity, Threat) will better allow the IPE to determine the 
internal and external resources and constraints that may complement or hinder plan 
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Figure 7. Calls for Better Planning and Coordination Integrated Planner  
and Executor Model 
(Yoder, 2004) 
Within the contingent environment, several key functions may be 
accomplished. Among prominent functions that require analysis and integration are 
diplomatic negotiations; host-nation support agreements; humanitarian operations; 
economic restoration; security and deweaponization; democratization and provision 
of essential services for food, shelter, safety, and security; medical provisioning and 
others.  Identifying key participants and capabilities within the sphere of operations 
can and should be further integrated into actual plans, exercises, and, if required, 
actual contingency response. Traditional players in the warfighters’ and COCOMs’ 
arena include those identified in the Joint Planning and Execution Community, as 
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Contingency Contracting Handbook. The traditional players are presented in Figure 
8. However, in order to effectively integrate contracting into the JPEC roles and to 
ensure that a comprehensive CONPLAN, OPLAN, and OPORD include fully 
integrative analysis, other non-traditional players must be included and participate in 
the SWOT assessment.  
 
Figure 8. Players in the Planning Process 
(JCCHB, 2009) 
Which outside organizations and stakeholders can perform some of the 
desired missions? The Yoder Three-Tier Model calls for more comprehensive 
stakeholder inclusion and incorporation into assessment planning and SWOT 
analysis. Examples of more comprehensive stakeholder participation include, but 
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volunteer organizations (PVOs) developing disaster response plans or humanitarian 
aid operations, such as the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID).  Several, if not hundreds, of organizations and other nations may be at 
work within a contingent environment.  Examples of other organizations include the 
United Nations (UN) and its Department of Human Affairs (UNDHA), the UN High 
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN International Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF), the UN Development Program, and the UN Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations. There may also be a need to integrate interests and capabilities from 
NATO and coalition countries. Strategic-level planning, including complementary 
contract planning, can capitalize on the capabilities of all available participants, 
potentially optimizing the desired effect.  
In addition to those entities external to the DoD, an internal stakeholder 
assessment must be conducted. Internal stakeholders include all of the joint 
operations codes, and, of particular importance, include the contracting support 
networks that will be essential for the seamless award and administration of 
contracts.  This includes Service command requirements generators, service organic 
contracting such as the Army Contracting Command (ACC), Expeditionary 
Contracting Command (ECC), the Naval Expeditionary Contracting Command 
(NECC) and the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), Defense Contract 
Management Agency – International (DCMA-I), and Defense Contract Audit Agency.   
The advantages of integrating all of the stakeholders into comprehensive 
planning is that it will allow for better determination of requirements in phase zero 
prior to the manifestation of any actual event requiring a response, and it will ensure 
that lines of authority, financing, establishment of support hierarchy, and all the other 
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b. Existing & Proposed Annex W – CSIP (Contract Support 
Integration Plan) and Logistics/Contracting Annexes. 
Analysis must include any existing CONPLAN, OPLAN, and OPORDs.  
Annex W and CSIP should be in place for any existing overarching plans. However, 
because the mandate for Operational Contract Support and Annex W/CSIP 
protocols is relatively new, it is essential to utilize the IPE and associated staff to 
review, revise, or create these documents in harmony with the broader 
recommendations for SWOT assessments and integration presented therein.  
 
Figure 9. Upstream/Downstream Perspective OV-1: Refine and 
 Influence the Joint OCS Planning Process 
(OCS, March 2010) 
Annex W requires the inputs from all of the Joint sections J-1 through J-7 and, 
in particular, the J-4 and J-5 staffs. The protocols utilized should be in compliance 
with Joint Publication 4-0, Joint Publication 5-0, and Joint Publication 4-10, along 
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creating the relational networks mandated under the newer Joint doctrinal and DoD 
instruction along with the design flow as presented in Figure 7. As part of this 
integration, the researcher contends that the IPE is an integral position that must be 
in place in order to perform all of the coordination and assessments necessary for 
comprehensive planning.  
c. Capability Gap Analysis (CGA). 
Capability gap analysis includes the processes of examining all requirements 
in the context of what must be accomplished and how it must be accomplished, and 
it includes determining critical gaps in logistic and organic provisioning that must be 
addressed through contracted support. The IPE must identify all stakeholders, 
supporting and supported units, the overarching scheme of operations in harmony 
with the CONPLAN, OPLAN, and where appropriate the OPORD from the 
perspective of the warfighter and logistician.  The IPE must then develop specifics 
as to what capabilities are required for the effective and efficient conduct of the 
contingency/expeditionary mission. Ultimately, the goal of CGA is to clearly identify 
gaps with clear courses of action (COAs) developed for satisfying those gaps. The 
COAs determined to be most tenable should be embedded within existing 
CONPLANs, OPLANs and OPORDs. OPLANs should be exercised with the 
selected COA examined for its efficacy within the broader mission plan. This is a 
broad step forward in the existing JOPES Deliberate and Crisis Action Planning 
systems, in which contracting is seldom designed and built into exercise planning in 
any truly significant manner. The IPE is the critical position to ensure that this 
function is occurring.   
d. Basic Life Support (BLS) and Higher Order Forward Post 
Ops analysis. 
Basic Life Support (BLS) and associated higher-order forward-post operations 
require assessment of all the aforementioned issues, with the addition of personnel, 
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presence. This includes a strategic assessment of all camp or post sites as to the 
engineering, construction, logistic, and sustainment capabilities required to create 
and operate forward posts and camps. Personnel skill set and credential inventory 
must be conducted by the IPE. The IPE role is to ascertain the total requirement and 
ensure that proper manning is available organically or via contract provisioning. 
e. Spend Analysis and Integration.  
 The IPE should conduct macro-level spend analysis by utilizing any recent, 
pertinent historical data. This data may be obtained from a variety of sources and 
may include the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS), consultancy analysts 
such as RAND, and any organic sources such as purchase and contract histories in 
SPS/DP2 systems. This information can then be used to identify those goods and 
services that would normally be used to fill existing capability gaps. According to the 
JEBCES project researchers (Poree et al., 2008a , 2008b), this information can be 
utilized further to create pre-awarded IDIQ contracts for those items and services 
most in demand for specific CONPLANs and OPLANs. Poree et al. (2008a, 2008b) 
noted that a significant reduction in response time and improved support resulted 
from the spend analysis and integration into planning and exercising—phase zero—
and being correctly postured in the event that an actual contingent event manifests. 
Integrating spend analysis criteria into the IPE JOPES deliberate planning process 
phase zero exercise cycle—provided that JOPES is revised to include a more robust 
contracting support analytical framework—will enhance potential capability and 
support effect if it is used correctly. 
f. Creating Multiple Award Contracts (MAC) and Indefinite 
Delivery Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) for Strategic Capability 
Fulfillment. 
Multiple Award Contracts (MAC) and Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity 
type contracts (IDIQ) can and should be established at the strategic level by the IPE. 
Spend analysis in combination with the other factors indicated herein, including, but 
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above, can and should indicate those goods and services not available organically 
from existing service support or inter-service agreement. Those goods and services 
identified as high usage, critical, or recurring for a particular mission or missions can 
then be contracted on a regional or theater basis via MAC or IDIQ.   Any good or 
service not available organically, and fitting IPE established criteria for inclusion as a 
MAC or IDIQ, can and should be a significant IPE function.  
g. Phase Synchronization with the OPLAN via JOPES. 
Phase synchronization is necessary to optimize the availability of essential 
goods and services in time sequence with the warfighters’ and operational 
commanders’ key event schedule or phase. The warfighters’ phasing may be, and 
often is, expressed in different terminology and different sequence than the 
traditional contracting four-step phasing in support of operations. Traditionally, 
contract planners utilize a four-phase system for planning operations support.  
Phase I is the initial deployment, Phase II is the build-up, Phase III is the 
stabilization, and Phase IV is the termination and redeployment. The operations side 
of the planning staffs utilize, most often, a five- or even six-phase system that 
includes, for example, kinetic battle operations. The IPE must examine the exercise 
and execution plans, CONPLANS, OPLANS, and OPORDS in order to synchronize 
and optimize the timing of contract provisioning to best serve the interests of the 
associated plans.    
The JOPES system is the hardware/software systems utilized in the planning 
and exercise of CONPLANS and OPLANS and in the execution of associated 
OPORDS.   JOPES relies on a robust logistics and mobilization system model called 
the Time-phased Forced Deployment Data (TPFDD). The TPFDD system contains 
real-time capital transportation asset information for every ship, aircraft, rail, and 
operation unit, to include size, capacity, exact location, port, and airfield capacities 
as well as embarkation and debarkation points and capabilities, to name just some 
of its data. Figure 10 shows how TPFDD modeling accounts for the essential 
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Figure 10. The Strategic Deployment Problem 
(CCH, 2006) 
Again, this information is real-time and allows the planner to create movement 
plans and phase the movement capability to synchronize with the COCOMs’ 
objectives. The TPFDD is an essential tool in determining constraints, in that it 
allows for assessments to be made at mobilization and deployments given the 
current state of force and transportation location and movement capability in 
association with capacity and time constraints. The IPE can and should be well 
versed in the utilization and analysis of overarching CONPLAN, OPLAN, and 
OPORD design and in what TPFDD modeling does, and potentially can do, for 
structuring the most appropriate contracting posture and response for exercise and 
actual operations.   
The IPE can structure contract support to complement results of TPFDD 
mobilization in the JOPES system. This function is currently not being accomplished 
in any consistent or comprehensive manner as part of doctrine and/or actual 
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h. Creating the Contract Support Integration Plan (CSIP) 
and/or the Contingency Contracting Support Plan (CCSP). 
The overall objective of the IPE mission is to create a comprehensive, 
executable contracting plan that is fully integrated and synchronized with the 
CONPLAN, OPLAN, and OPORD. The contracting plan, by the newer title 
Contracting Support Integration Plan (CSIP), is embedded into Annex W of the 
overarching PLAN.  Recent doctrine replaces the Contingency Contracting Support 
Plan (CCSP) moniker under Annex D. The newest doctrine calls for a separate 
annex called Annex W – Operational Contract Support. Regardless of which title is 
utilized, the plan should be appropriately exercised, validated, and updated as 
required.14   
i. IPE Unique Metrics and Assessment for Phase Zero. 
Integral to the entire phase zero concept is the establishment of sound 
business and operational metrics associated with contract support and their effect on 
operational plan and event success. Metrics should measure across the platform, 
personnel, and protocol pillars, with crosscutting metrics for efficiency and 
effectiveness, in addition to the identification and analysis of specific functional areas 
herein.15  These metrics should be in place and utilized throughout the planning and 
exercise phase zero as a mechanism to test the CSIP and associated plans. As part 
of a sound analysis, the continuous feedback loop—plan, do, check, and act—must 
be fully integrated into the assessment and refinement of any contract support plan.  
                                            
14 CSIP should be developed with all the aforementioned and should include details as indicated in 
paragraph D.  
15 Effectiveness is paraphrased by the author as doing the right things, whereas efficiency is defined 
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5. Question 4:  When must strategic planning take place?   
a. Phase Zero—Planning and Exercise Cycle 
It should be clear to the reader that comprehensive and integrative planning 
must take place in Phase Zero. The author contends and proposes that all doctrine 
and planning directives must include phase zero as the planning and exercise phase 
prior to an actual crisis event requiring an actual deployment of forces, and must 
include sound contract planning and integration into the warfighters’ systems for 
planning and execution within JOPES.16    
The IPE contracting must be integral to the Deliberate and Crisis Action 
Planning cycles that create the CONPLAN, OPLAN and OPORD.  Within the JOPES 
system framework, the JPEC develops the comprehensive plans for potential future 
events based on likely threats and/or the National Military Strategy and directives 
from the CJCS for each Area of Responsibility (AOR) assigned to a particular 
COCOM. The products or documents created by the planning event timeline are 
simplified and presented in Figure 11.   
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Figure 11. The Planning Summary 
 (CCH, 2006) 
During phase zero, the IPE will perform all of the aforementioned 
assessments, SWOT, strategic spend analysis, etc., and will incorporate and 
integrate these into formal elements of the CONPLAN, OPLAN, and OPORD as 
appropriate.    
b. Continuous Pre-Crisis Event Validation and Feedback. 
  Phase zero planning must be done in the Deliberate Planning Process, as 
identified in the top part of Figure 9. Phase zero must include all of the planning and 
exercising normally associated with COCOM Joint and Combined operations and 
must include robust development, exercising, and assessment of the Contract 
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continuous feedback loop of plan, do, check, act can take place in as little as 12 to 
24 months (a typical exercise cycle within a COCOM) to over several years. 
Additionally, the plans can be exercised and reviewed over several successive 
cycles, constantly being assessed and updated to meet doctrinal, force structure, 
threat, and other changes that may affect elements of the plan.   
c.  Crisis Action Planning (CAP)—Real-world Event OPORD.  
In the event that an actual real-world crisis manifests, the CONPLAN or 
OPLAN, depending on their availability and appropriateness, will be selected for 
revision and tailoring, including developing real-event tailored Courses of Action 
(COA) to effectively and efficiently respond to the real-life event requiring DoD force 
response. This process is called Crisis Action Planning and must include the IPE. 
Several key differences exist between routine phase-zero planning and 
exercising under the Deliberate Planning Process and the real-life response to an 
actual crisis. Time is one of the foremost differences of note; during an actual crisis, 
time is of the essence, but there are others factors as well. Specifically, the author 
contends that without a well-vetted, IPE-generated plan during the phase zero cycle, 
contracting will be forced to develop support in a hasty, ad hoc, and reactionary 
manner that will potentially hinder operational support, waste resources, and 
potentially cost lives.  
Clearly, comprehensive plan development and assessment will not occur 
without the credentialed IPE called for by the Yoder Three-tier Model.     
6. Question 5:  Why must strategic planning take place?    
The IPE must conduct strategic planning for some obvious reasons, most of 
which should be clear at this point but which are summarized within the context of 
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a. Creating Desired Effect.   
The ultimate goal of any operational support plan, including the CSIP, is to 
create an executable framework for force provisioning of goods and services 
required by operational forces for optimally achieving the mission defined in the 
CONPLAN, OPLAN, and OPORD. As JEBCES research (Poree et al., 2008a, 
2008b) indicates, a greater and contracted support effect can occur with 
comprehensive planning by the YTTM IPE, creating and implementing sound 
business plans. This includes creation of IDIQ and/or dormant turnkey-ready 
contracts for support in the event that an actual crisis occurs.  
b. Meeting Tenets of War—In a Business Sense! 
The author contends that the main purpose of the contracting function is to 
support the warfighter and his associated missions. Hence, the IPE should develop, 
exercise, and implement plans in harmony with the warfighter’s tenets. Specifically, 
the Army’s FM-30 includes a discussion on objective, offensive, mass, economy of 
force, maneuver, unity-of-command, security, surprise, and simplicity. While the 
tenets of war iterated in FM-30 are clearly focused on warfighting design, there are 
clear and important implications for the IPE in developing the contract plans that will 
complement the warfighter. Specifically, the tenets’ applicability to contracting and 
business operations includes, but is not limited to those indicated below. 
(1) Objective.  Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, 
decisive, and attainable objective. The IPE must accomplish this through sound 
analysis, structure, planning, exercising, and employment of plans and schema that 
complement the COCOM objective. 
(2)  Offensive. This term means to seize and hold the initiative.  
Warfighters normally associate this term with battle operations, but the IPE can 
employ the “seize the initiative” concept through forward planning and execution 
strategies designed for specific operations. This term also means being ready in 
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(3)  Mass. Mass is providing overwhelming power at the decisive place 
and time. It includes synchronizing all the elements of power, combat, and 
contracting where they will have a decisive effect on an enemy force in a short 
period of time in order to achieve mass. Massing effects, rather than a concentration 
of forces, can enable numerically inferior forces to achieve decisive results while 
limiting exposure to the enemy, including enemy fire. The IPE can leverage the 
functional analysis and resulting MAC, IDIQ, phasing, strategic spend analysis, and 
all the other functions presented herein to create the greatest effect. 
(4) Economy of Force.  This term means the employment of all combat 
and contracting power available in the most effective way possible; it also means to 
allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary or non-essential efforts and 
functions. Inclusive in economy of force is to judiciously employ and distribute 
forces, with no force left without purpose, and the measurement of effectiveness and 
efficiency in utilizing scarce resources.  
(5) Maneuver. Maneuver is the movement of forces to gain positional 
advantage. It is used to exploit successes, preserve freedom of action, and reduce 
vulnerability. The IPE can utilize this tenet for creating the contract support schema 
to complement force maneuver and for maximum effect. Knowing in time-phase 
when, where, and how operations will be conducted can be advantageous in 
creating support plans that posture support where and when it is required.  
(6)  Unity of Command. Unity of command is a clearly defined hierarchy 
with singular message.  At all levels of war, employment of military forces in a 
manner that masses combat power and contracting power toward a common 
objective requires unity of command and unity of effort. Unity of command means 
that all of the forces are under the direction and control of one responsible 
commander. It requires a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all 
forces pursuant to a unified purpose. Note that contracting, and contracting officers 
by warranted authority, in an operational setting will have two commanders! One 
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warrant issuant’s chain of command. This does not mean that unity of command is 
impossible. Integrating the IPE into strategic-level planning and exercising and 
creating plans in harmony with the COCOM (CONPLAN, OPLAN, and OPORD) 
objectives helps to ensure unity of command and can help to eliminate friction in 
control and communication, making contracting responsive to the commanders’ 
intent. 
(7) Security. Never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected 
advantage. Security enhances freedom of action by reducing vulnerability to hostile 
acts, influence, or surprise. Knowledge and understanding of potential enemy 
threats combined with adequate security measures embedded in the contracting 
plan design can reduce security threats to all operating forces. Proper design can 
include compartmentalization of security access, including those with Top Secret 
and Secret classifications. Designing, exercising, and implementing 
compartmentalized structure to maintain critical information barriers and limit access 
to the entire design scheme to only those at the top IPE level must be incorporated 
into mission and contracting design.   
(8) Surprise. Surprise, according to FM-30, means the capability to strike 
the enemy at a time, in a place, or in a manner for which he is unprepared. Surprise 
can decisively shift the balance of combat power. By seeking surprise, forces can 
achieve success well out of proportion to the effort expended. How can surprise be 
incorporated into business and contracting plans? Simply put, surprise can be in 
tempo, size of force, direction or location of the main effort, or timing. The IPE can 
create robust plans with feints or false business intelligence indicators that are 
utilized by design to create uncertainty in the enemy’s intelligence estimates. Note 
that this type of planning may be required in combat operations, but most likely 
would not be required in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), or the 
Range of Military Operations (ROMO).  However, when needed, deception can aid 
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(9) Simplicity. Simplicicy is the clear, uncomplicated plans and concise 
orders to ensure thorough understanding. Everything in war is very simple, but the 
simple thing is difficult. To the uninitiated, military operations are not difficult. 
Simplicity contributes to successful operations. Simple plans and clear, concise 
orders minimize misunderstanding and confusion. Other factors being equal, 
parsimony is preferred.  (Adopted and revised by the researcher from Department of 
the Army -- Field Manual (FM – 30).  
D. Time-Phase Integrated Product—The Contracting Support 
Integration Plan (CSIP) 
The CSIP is the primary tangible hard-copy product that the IPE must create.  
The CSIP is the written plan that, when properly constructed and vetted, will 
complement the CONPLAN, OPLAN, and OPORD and create the desired effect for 
the COCOM. The tangible plan is nothing more than words on paper, but it is what it 
can accomplish—given proper IPE authorities and empowerment—in the context of 
broader mission planning where it gains its true power to enhance a capability.   
To be an effective instrument, the CSIP must be created with all the factors 
and considerations iterated previously, including all of the tenets of war being 
considered. Additionally, the plan must be properly exercised in phase zero via 
JOPES with robust metrics for effectiveness and efficiency across personnel 
platforms and protocols.   
What exactly is contained in the CSIP?  A sound CSIP should include, at a 
minimum, all of the elements listed in the following paragraphs, with particular 
tailoring to meet the specific CONPLAN, OPLAN, and OPORD mission requirements 
and functions that were addressed in the previous sections. Essential elements 
include, but are certainly not limited to, the following: 
 Command and control relationships. 
 Location and structure of the contracting office and suboffices, 
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 Procedures for appointing, training, and employing OOs, CORs, 
Disbursing Agents, and GCPC holders. 
 Manpower, equipment, and supplies required for contracting support 
and the deployment sequence. 
 Types of supplies, services, and construction customers can expect to 
receive through contingency contracting; list any special prioritization 
or control measures for scarce commodities or services. 
 Procedures for defining, validating, processing, and satisfying 
customer requirements.  
 Procedures for budgeting and payments to vendors.  
 Procedures for closing out contracting operations and redeployment.  
 Security requirements and procedures for contracting and contractor 
personnel. 
 Specific statutory/regulatory constraints or exemptions, which apply to 
the supported operation. 
 Description of the concept of contracting operations that is phased and 
synchronized with the supported plan. 
 Description and assessment of host-nation agreements, customs, 
laws, culture, language, religion, and business practices that will 
impact contracting operations. 
Another area that needs to be addressed is the environmental impact of the 
operation. Specifically, what environmental laws must be followed? This area could 
have a significant impact on the CCO because these laws may need to be 
incorporated into some of the service contracts. The general rule of thumb is that the 
U.S. will abide by the host nation’s environmental laws unless U.S. laws are more 
stringent. The CCO should review Annex L (Environmental Considerations) of the 
OPLAN to become familiar with any special considerations for the operation. This 
issue is likely to take an even bigger role in future operations due to increasing 
national and international attention focused on the environmental impacts of military 
operations (CSIP from JCCHB, First Edition, pg. 7-17 and 7-18 and excerpt from 
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E.  Process Mapping—Laying Out the Integrated Concept 
The author has presented many concepts, factors, and requirements for the 
IPE at the strategic level. It is important to assimilate the IPE into standard business 
practices that incorporate a very basic logic flow to generating and vetting plans. 
Each specific CONPLAN, OPLAN, and OPORD will require specific process 
mapping, but the author proposes a basic stepped design for conceptual ease and 
simplicity in putting these concepts into action.17  
Step 1: Identify and analyze the most critical, or the most likely, CONPLAN, 
OPLAN, or OPORD that requires a comprehensive CSIP to be created, exercised, 
and validated/vetted.  
Step 2: Perform analysis as described in paragraph C-3 (a through g) and C-
4 of this chapter, wherein each subparagraph element is a sub-step or check in the 
analytical process and design of the CSIP.  
Step 3: Create and exercise (phase zero) the CSIP to include robust 
effectiveness and efficiency metrics. Utilize integrated feedback loops to make 
corrections and adjustments to plans as exercised in JOPES.  
Following this simple logic will help to ensure that the IPE incorporates the 
elements necessary for synchronized and optimized support.   
F.  Chapter Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter proposed and provided the conceptual models for fully 
integrative contingency and expeditionary contract planning in the joint environment.  
While previous chapters, particularly chapter 2 and 3, have demonstrated that there 
has been a significant amount of forward movement in doctrine, directives, and 
                                            
17 Note that in order to perform these steps, the author contends that all the recommendations in 
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practice—particularly since 2008—a thorough review of these materials reveals that 
currently, there is no single integrative model or framework fully embracing all of the 
elements necessary for successful integrative planning. This chapter defined and 
expanded on these elements, which the researcher considered imperative for 
integrative contract planning in the joint environment. Chapter V presents the 
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V. Conclusions, Recommendations, and 




The Department of Defense use of contractors has increased dramatically in 
the past decade. In Iraq alone, the number of contractor personnel now exceeds the 
number of uniformed military personnel. Congress has recently increased scrutiny of 
and expressed concern over the significant challenges that the DoD faces in 
planning, executing, and managing operational contract support. Among the many 
challenges are, for example, failure to adequately integrate contracting into 
operation planning, exercising, and employment and difficulty in managing the same. 
To address these concerns, Congress enacted an amendment to title 10 U.S.C. and 
added section 2333, which directs the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop joint policy for contingency and Operational Contract 
Support requirements definition, contingency program management, and 
contingency operations during combat and post-conflict operations. The Operational 
Contract Support mandate, in addition to concepts presented herein, create the 
framework for a better structure for planning and executing joint planning that 
properly integrates contract support into comprehensive plans for effective and 
efficient utilization of contractors in supporting roles across the full spectrum of war, 
peacetime, and other operations in which contractors will be integral to mission 
success.   
GAO reports to date indicate that some progress has been made in 
Operational Contract Support. However, additional progress must be made to 
ensure effective and efficient integration of contracted support into operations plans 
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the increasing demands of the warfighter, congressional overseers, and for the 
increased and continued support and confidence of the American taxpayer. 
The Naval Postgraduate School has published several works that highlight 
significant progress in the planning and execution of Operational Contract Support. 
For example, the Yoder Three-tier Model (YTTM) (Yoder, 2004), the Joint Effects-
based Contracting project (Poree, et. al., 2008a, 2008b), and many others are 
recently published works that may be instrumental in shaping public and military 
policy related to the structure, planning, and execution of Operational Contract 
Support. 
Of particular note is the NPS Joint Effects-based Contracting project (Poree, 
et. al., 2008a, 2008b), that created a new concept of operational contract support 
and developed and exercised simulation modeling to demonstrate the efficacy of the 
concepts. Among the key elements of the work was the identification and creation of 
a Phase Zero operational model. The results are that with the Phase “0” concept in 
operation, significant efficiencies and greater effectiveness can be achieved in 
planning and executing any operation requiring Operational Contract Support. 
This sponsored research examined in detail, recent doctrinal, policy, and 
practice changes to determine the extent and ability to which strategic-level 
integrative planning is established and in practice, and any deficiencies in the same.  
Additionally, this paper examined the Integrated Planner and Executor (IPE) 
credentialed strategic-level personnel, originally proposed in the Yoder Three-tier 
Model for Optimal Planning and Execution of Contingency Contracting (Yoder, 
2004), along with key elements of the Joint Effects-based Contracting Execution 
System (JEBCES) originally authored by Kelly Poree, Karina Curtiss, Jeremy Morrill, 
and Steve Sherwood and funded by the Acquisition Research Program (ARP) 
(Poree, et al., 2008a, 2008b). This paper integrated the IPE and JEBCES concepts 
along with expanding these prior models to include greater details of the functional 
integration in existing warfighter exercising and execution systems, including the 
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this paper defined critical functions to bring those prior models up to a fully 
executable status.    
2. Primary and Subsidiary Questions Addressed. 
This chapter addresses and answers the final subsidiary question, What 
policy implications are inherent if the research conclusions and recommendations 
are followed? The primary and subsidiary research questions are answered within 
the report chapters and summarized in the conclusions, implications, and 
recommendations.  
B. Conclusions and Implications 
The research design and objective was to integrate the Yoder Three-tier 
Model strategic top tier, the Integrated Planner and Executor (IPE), with the Joint 
Effects-based Contract Execution System and Effects-based Contracting into current 
strategic planning processes. The results of this research highlight several 
conclusions.   
1. Lack of Strategic Integrated Planning.   
There exists a solid and recent history of calls for better strategic-level 
planning for contingency and expeditionary contracting such as the Yoder-three Tier 
Model (Yoder, 2004), GAO reports, and ongoing efforts by the Congressional 
Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (CWCIA, 2009). The 
implications are clearly evident—the DoD does not currently perform strategic 
integrated contract planning well, if at all in some cases. Lack of integrated planning 
results in suboptimization, less effectiveness, and loss of efficiency. Given the tenets 
of war presented in Chapter IV, failure to “plan as you fight” can erode the key tenets 
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2. Solid Contract Planning Framework Virtually Non-Existent.  
Doctrine and policy examination and analysis revealed that while extensive 
improvements have been made in incorporating contracting into strategic-level 
planning, including establishment of Joint Doctrine for Operational Contract Support 
(OCS) under Joint Publication 4-10, they fail to provide the necessary framework of 
primary enablers, defined by the researcher as personnel, platforms, and protocols, 
to provide a sound doctrinal framework for the structure and execution of integrated 
planning. The lack of a single, solid foundation, including the basic pillars of 
personnel, platforms and protocols as proposed within this paper, as an initial 
framework will result in suboptimized and/or ad hoc planning. Without the required 
pillars and framework it will be difficult  to have optimized mission attainment. Robust 
contract capability must be designed and incorporated into Joint and Combined 
exercises. 
3. Utilizing Existing Warfighter Planning and Exercising Platforms 
Will Facilitate Contract Planning Integration and Assimilation.   
Utilizing existing warfighter and joint planning doctrine, including Joint 
Publication 4-10, Joint Publication 5-0, and Joint Publication 4-0, to name three 
primary sources, and existing warfighter exercising and execution system platforms, 
including the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and the 
robust mobilization tool, the Time Phased Forced Deployment Data (TPFDD) 
systems, will allow for a construct of integrated plans that can be properly vetted 
prior to the occurrence of an actual crisis event. An advantage of utilizing JOPES 
and associated platforms is that the warfighter community is already seasoned with 
this system. It is already well integrated into the command and control networks 
established globally for the DoD. Integrating more robust contract planning into the 
JOPES Deliberate Planning Process (DPP) and Crisis Action Planning (CAP) 
processes through IPE functional integration will result in an optimized CONPLAN, 
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4. Integrated Planner and Executor (IPE) billets or positions within 
both Joint and Service Commands Have Not Been Established.  
The Integrated Planner and Executor (IPE) position with the YTTM credential, 
including JPME qualification, must be assigned and responsible for the execution of 
the development, exercise, revision, and employment of robust, integrated Contract 
Support Integration Plans (CSIP) in accordance with the design pillars—personnel, 
platforms and protocols—and within the functional guidance presented in Chapter 
IV. While the Gansler Report (Gansler, 2007) was instrumental in establishing 
strategic flag/SES-level contracting positions with the Army, ultimately driving the 
establishment of the Army Contracting Command (ACC), it did not specify the 
functional requirements discussed in this paper, nor are the Army’s joint counterpart 
IPE positions established at the UCC to integrate the pillars and functions required 
to connect contracting to specific CONPLAN, OPLAN, and OPROD. In order for the 
YTTM IPE to function properly, both the Joint and Service communities must have 
IPE billets and must be tasked with conducting the integrated planning as outlined 
here. Obviously, having the right person with the best credentials at the strategic 
level is imperative. The functions required at this level of planning are too complex 
and challenging for anything less than the properly credentialed and tasked IPE. 
Currently, both in Joint and Service commands, there is a huge gap in the credential 
and functional assignment of duties that the IPE is envisioned to fulfill. Filling this 
gap with credentialed IPE will have a large impact on community career paths for a 
finite number of those individuals desiring or designated to obtain the credential and 
accept IPE positions, if established.   
5. Integrated Planner and Executor (IPE) Complements Tenets of 
War and Sound Business Practices.    
The functional IPE, when established, can and should create contract 
integration plans squarely within the established tenets of war. This is an important 
selling feature to the warfighter community to willingly accept and utilize the IPE in 
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themselves as an enabling asset within the tenets of war construct. This failure 
results in a misunderstanding and often a marginalization of contracting as a key 
enabler of the warfighter. With credentialed IPE positions functioning in and on 
behalf of the warfighter’s circles, a true value-added synergy and complement of the 
tenets of war will occur. Additionally, spend analysis, Multiple Award 
Contract/Indefinite Delivery Type Contract award for theater support, better 
command and control and battle space management of personnel and contractors, 
determining sound business cost estimates for missions, determining spend profiles, 
etc. are all hallmarks of sound business planning that need to be incorporated into 
the DoD planning structure.  
6. Costs versus Benefits: Up-front Costs with Potentially Huge 
Payout. 
There is clearly a huge cost to bringing the IPE position into the DoD and to 
conducting fully integrated joint contacting planning within JOPES. Although a 
specific dollar-cost analysis is not within the scope of this research, cost is an area 
that all participants in the research working group indicated was a barrier to 
successful implementation. Career-path training and education for the IPE, clearly 
more comprehensive than most senior-level contracting officers and/or 1102 series 
contract specialists receive, will take more time and more money than is currently 
expended. Additionally, developing and implementing robust integrated modeling 
and simulation into the JOPES framework will also require a large investment in 
human and monetary capital. For example, as a rough order of magnitude (ROM) 
estimate, if Congress authorized 10 IPE flag/SES-level positions—one for each 
Unified Combatant Command (UCC), both regional and functional, and one for each 
major service—and properly staffed the IPE position with three credentialed 
supporting staff members at the 0-5/0-6 level, the price tag per UCC would be 
approximately $750,000 per year. Using this rough order of magnitude estimate, the 
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counterparts, totaling $10.5 million for the complete UCC and Service structure as 
proposed.   
The personnel price of implementation can be far outweighed by the tangible 
benefits from the proper functioning of the IPE. As the Joint Effects-based 
Contracting Execution System research proved (see Chapter III), a properly 
structured IPE combined with phase zero peacetime planning can and does have 
huge payoff in terms of reduced response time, greater utilization of competitively 
awarded contracts such as MAC/IDIQ, full compliance with the  Competition in 
Contracting Act (CICA), better battle space management, command and control, and 
greater harmony and achievement of mission objectives while incorporating the 
tenets of war, synchronized with the CONPLAN, OPLAN, and OPORD and within 
the constructs of sound business planning.  Ultimately, and most important, better 
planning and management may result in placing fewer personnel in harm’s way or at 
risk of casualty or death, something desirable to everyone and something it is 
difficult to place a monetary value on.  
C. Recommendations 
Logically, several recommendations follow from the research and are as 
follows in order of implementation priority. 
1. Congressional Action Required.  
Congress must formally establish and fund Integrated Planner and Executor 
(IPE) billets/positions within each and every Unified Combatant Command (UCC) 
and military Service component. Establishing the IPE will require Congressional 
authorization and funding because these are flag/SES-level positions.  Additionally, 
initial staffs should be assigned with appropriate credential. Without this critical 
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2. IPE Analysis and Integration Mandatory.  
Once established, the IPE must conduct analysis and develop integrated and 
synchronized strategic-level Contract Support Integration Plans (CSIP) for all critical 
CONPLAN, OPLAN, and OPORD. The IPE and staff must conduct comprehensive 
analyses, design robust exercises incorporated into the JOPES and TPFDD 
systems, and properly asses and refine the CSIP on a continuous basis. They must 
also ensure that comprehensive metrics for effectiveness and efficiency are 
embedded in assessments of plan formulation, exercise, and execution.  
3. Establish Phase Zero IDIQ and MAC Contracts.   
The IPE, once in place and having conducted sound analysis, must establish 
IDIQ and MAC contracts.  Establishing competitively awarded, Competition in 
Contracting Act (CICA)–compliant Multiple Award Contracts (MAC) and Indefinite 
Delivery Indefinite QuantityType Contracts (IDIQ) that are in harmony with theater 
support warfighter and operational plans can be fully exercised and vetted in the 
Deliberate Planning Process cycle of war planning. This will result in greater 
effectiveness and efficiency, and allow for faster and more targeted reaction 
capability.   
D. Areas for Additional Research 
Additional areas of research include, but are certainly not limited to: 
1. Identification and assignment of IPE to Unified Combatant 
Commands (UCC) and Service components—specifically, 
development of the career paths and a model for actual 
education, billet structure, and associated details.  
2. Design and construct of robust strategic contract planning 
models for incorporation into JOPES and TPFDD systems. This 
will likely include more than a few research, consulting, and 
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described in Chapter IV must be incorporated. How to best 
model and simulate these in a parametric manner will be a major 
undertaking.   
E. Final Summary 
This research makes the case for formally establishing the Integrated Planner 
and Executor position as the primary enabler of zero operations.   Phase Zero is the 
operational phase actually occurring during the Deliberate Planning Process, prior to 
an actual crisis event occurring requiring formal Crisis Action Planning. What is clear 
is that the DoD continues to suboptimize its contract support due to a lack of 
integrated, strategic-level planning and a concurrent lack of synchronization with 
CONPLAN, OPLAN, and OPORD. Most often, contracting has been an ad hoc 
reaction to emerging warfighter requirements. However, the author contends that 
establishing the credentialed IPE, assigning specific tasks for plan development and 
exercising, and establishing pre-awarded contracts in phase zero based on sound 


















do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 77 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
List of References  
Anderson & Flaherty. (2003) Analysis of the contingency contracting support plan 
within the joint planning process framework / Michael S. Anderson, Gregory 
P. Flaherty. Monterey, CA, Naval Postgraduate School. 
Andres, R., & Hukill, J. (2007).  Anaconda, a flawed joint planning process. Joint 
Forces Quarterly, 47(4), 135-140. Retrieved from 
https://digitalndulibrary.ndu.edu/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/ndupress
&CISOPTR=20159&REC=3.  
Army AL&T Magazine. (AL&T Magazine, 2004) “Contingency Contracting 
Operations—Achieving Better Results,” Army AL&T Magazine, January-
February 2004 edition. 
Barbaris, R., & Callanan, C. (2008, September). United States Army contingency 
contracting operations: Emerging roles, procedures, and challenges facing 
contracting professionals (MBA Joint applied project). Monterey, CA: Naval 
Postgraduate School.  
Borzoo, A., Short, C. S., & VanderWerf, S. (2009, October).  Joint acquisition 
command doctrine—A success story. The Defense Acquisition Review 
Journal, 52(16), 270-281.   
Burke, K. (2010, March 2). Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Joint Contingency 
Acquisition Support Office (JCASO) overview (Unpublished PowerPoint 
presentation).  . Operational Contract Support Conference,.  
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). (n.d.). Joint doctrine: Joint force 
employment, planning for joint operations. J-7 Operational Plans and 
Interoperability Directorate. Washington, DC: Author. Retrieved from 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/doctrine.htm  
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). (2006, December 26). Joint operation 
planning (Joint Publication 5-0). Washington, DC: Author. Retrieved from 
http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp5_0.pdf  
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). (2008a, July 18). Joint logistics (Joint 
Publication 4-0). Washington, DC: Author. Retrieved from 
http://www.osc.army.mil/supportingdocs/JP4_0.pdf 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). (2008b, October 17). Operational 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 78 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Commander, Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA). (2008, April 30). 
Memorandum of agreement between the Defense Contract Management 
Agency (DCMA) and Joint Contracting Command Iraq/Afghanistan (JCCI/A).  
Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. 
Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (CWCIA). (2009, 
September 21). Defense agencies must improve their oversight of contractor 
business systems to reduce fraud, waste and abuse [Special report on 
contractor business systems]. Retrieved from 
http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/docs/CWC_SR1_business-systems_2009-
09-21.pdf  
Congressional Budget Office. (2008, August). Contractors’ support of U.S. 
operations in Iraq (Publication No. 3053). Retrieved from 
www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/96xx/doc9688/08-12-IraqContractors.pdf  
Contingency Contracting Handbook (CCH), (2006) first edition, AFLMA, Maxwell 
AFB, 2006. 
Contingency Contracting Handbook – A Joint Handbook for the 21st Century, 
AFLMA, Maxwell AFB, 2008 
Department of the Army. (June 2001). Operations. (Field Manual 30).  
Department of the Army, Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Combined Arms 
Center (CAC). (2008, September). Deployed Contracting Officer’s 
Representative (COR)—Tactics, techniques, and procedures. Fort 
Leavenworth, KS: Department of the Army. 
Department of the Army, Headquarters. (1999, August 4). Contracting support on 
the battlefield (Field Manual 100-10-2). Department of the Army.  
Department of Defense (DoD). (2010, March 23).  Joint Contingency Contracting 
Officer’s Representative (COR) handbook (Draft). Retrieved from 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/ccap/cc/docs/JCCORH_3-23-10_for_Web.pdf  
Department of Defense Task Force on Contracting and Contract Management in 
Expeditionary Operations. (2008). 2008 Report to Congress—In response to 
section 849 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2008.Retrieved from 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/pacc/cc/docs/section849.pdf 
Donahue, B. (2008, July 23). Movement to an Army enterprise activity from an 
operational perspective—Land war net (Unpublished PowerPoint 









Gansler, J. (2007, October 31). Urgent reform required: Army expeditionary 
contracting—Report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program 
Management in Expeditionary Operations.  Retrieved from 
www.army.mil/docs/Gansler_Commission_Report_Final_071031.pdf  
Goodale, R.W., Jr. (1994). Planning for war: A system. JFQ 
Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2004, July). Military operations: DOD’s 
extensive use of logistics support contracts requires strengthened oversight. 
Washington, DC: Author. Retrieved from 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04854.pdf  
Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2008, November 20). Contract 
management: DOD developed draft guidance for operational contract support 
but has not met all legislative requirements. Washington, DC: Author. 
Retrieved from http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09114r.pdf 
Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2009a, August). Results-oriented 
management—Strengthening key practices at FEMA and Interior could 
promote greater use of performance information. Washington, DC: Author. 
Retrieved from http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09676.pdf  
Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2009b, September). DCAA audits: 
Widespread problems with audit quality require significant reform. 
Washington, DC: Author. Retrieved from 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09468.pdf  
Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2009c, September 9). AFGHANISTAN 
AND PAKISTAN oversight of U.S. interagency efforts: Statement of 
Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers Managing Director, International Affairs and 
Trade. Retrieved from http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d091015t.pdf  
Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2009d, September 29). Federal 
contracting: Observations on the government’s contracting data systems—
Statement of William T. Woods, Director Acquisitions and Sourcing 
Management. Retrieved from http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d091032t.pdf  
Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2009e, October). Contingency 
contracting: DOD, State, and USAID continue to face challenges in tracking 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 80 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2009f, October). Homeland defense: 
Planning, resourcing and training issues challenging DOD’s response to 
domestic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high-yield explosive 
incidents. Washington, DC: Author. Retrieved from 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10123.pdf 
Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2009g, December 15). Department of 
Homeland Security: A comprehensive strategy is still needed to achieve 
management integration department-wide—Statement of Bernice Steinhardt, 
Director Strategic Issues.  Retrieved from 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10318t.pdf  
Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2010a, March). War-fighter support: DOD 
needs to improve its planning for using contractors to support future military 
operations. Retrieved from http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10472.pdf 
Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2010b, March 17). War-fighter support: 
Continued actions needed by DOD to improve and institutionalize contractor 
support in contingency operations—Statement of William M. Solis, Director 
Defense Capabilities and Management. Retrieved from 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10551t.pdf  
Grasso, V. B. (2009, September 9). Defense logistical support contracts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan: Issues for Congress (RL33834). Retrieved from the 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) website: http://www.crs.gov  
Grasso, V. B. (2010, January 27). Defense logistical support contracts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan: Issues for Congress (RL33834). Retrieved from the 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) website: http://www.crs.gov  
Halverson, E. K. (2006, April). Roles and missions of the J4 in joint effects war-game 
(AU/ACSC/8930/AY06). Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force 
Base, AL. Retrieved from https://www.afresearch.org/  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). (2003, December). Allied joint logistic 
doctrine (AJP-4[A]). Retrieved from 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/stanag.htm 
OCS. (2010, March). Operational Contract Support  - slide show – Joint Logistics 
Staff of the Joint Forces, J-4, March 2010.  
Petraeus, D. H. (2010, February 17). Request to change the name of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom to Operation New Dawn [Memorandum]. Washington, DC: . 
Poree, K., Curtis, K., Morrill, J., & Sherwood, S. (2008a, December). The joint 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 81 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
future joint expeditionary contracting execution (MBA Joint applied project). 
Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School.    
Poree, K., Curtis, K., Morrill, J., & Sherwood, S. (2008b, December). The joint 
effects-based contracting execution system: A proposed enabling concept for 
future joint expeditionary contracting execution (NPS-AM-08-127). Monterey, 
CA: Acquisition Research Program, Naval Postgraduate School.    
Schwartz, M. (2008, December 17). Training the military to manage contractors 
during expeditionary operations: Overview and options for Congress 
(R40835). Retrieved from the Congressional Research Service (CRS) 
website: http://www.crs.gov  
Schwartz, M. (2009, September 29). The Department of Defense’s use of private 
security contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background, analysis, and 
options for Congress (R40835). Retrieved from the Congressional Research 
Service (CRS) website: http://www.crs.gov  
Stamatopoulas, P. (2010, January 12). Joint Staff J-4 Operational Contract 
Support—“Operationalizing OSC” (Unpublished PowerPoint presentation). 
USCENTCOM Acquisition Conference. 
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) (USD [AT&L]). 
(2005, October 3). DoD 3020.41 - Contractor personnel authorized to 
accompany the U.S. Armed Forces (3020.41). Washington, DC: Author.  
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) (USD [AT&L]). 
(2009, March 24). Orchestrating, synchronizing, and integrating program 
management of contingency acquisition planning and its operational 
execution (3020.49). Washington, DC: Author.   
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) (USD [AT&L]), 
Task Force on Wartime Contracting (TFWC). (2009, November 4).  
Department of Defense—Analysis of the interim report of the Commission on 
Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. Retrieved from 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/pacc/cc/docs/TFWC_Rpt_to_USD.pdf 
United Kingdom Ministry of Defense. (2007, April).  Joint Doctrine Logistics for joint 
operations (Joint Doctrine Publication 4-00, 3rd ed). Director General 
Development, Concepts and Doctrine. Retrieved from 
http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/MicroSite/DCDC/OurPublications/JDWP/J
ointDoctrinePublicationjdp400LogisticsForJointOperations.htm  
U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board. (2005, December).  Managing the 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 82 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
report to the President and Congress of the United States. Retrieved from 
http://www.dccw.hqda.pentagon.mil/downloads/CCE%20CORHdb.doc    
 Yoder, E. C. (2004, December). The Yoder three-tier model for optimal planning 
and execution of contingency contracting (NPS-AM-05-002). Monterey, CA: 
Acquisition Research Program, Naval Postgraduate School. 
 =
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= =  
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
2003 - 2010 Sponsored Research Topics 
Acquisition Management 
 Acquiring Combat Capability via Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) 
 BCA: Contractor vs. Organic Growth 
 Defense Industry Consolidation 
 EU-US Defense Industrial Relationships 
 Knowledge Value Added (KVA) + Real Options (RO) Applied to 
Shipyard Planning Processes  
 Managing the Services Supply Chain 
 MOSA Contracting Implications 
 Portfolio Optimization via KVA + RO 
 Private Military Sector 
 Software Requirements for OA 
 Spiral Development 
 Strategy for Defense Acquisition Research 
 The Software, Hardware Asset Reuse Enterprise (SHARE) repository 
Contract Management 
 Commodity Sourcing Strategies 
 Contracting Government Procurement Functions 
 Contractors in 21st-century Combat Zone 
 Joint Contingency Contracting 
 Model for Optimizing Contingency Contracting, Planning and Execution 
 Navy Contract Writing Guide 
 Past Performance in Source Selection 
 Strategic Contingency Contracting 
 Transforming DoD Contract Closeout 
 USAF Energy Savings Performance Contracts 
 USAF IT Commodity Council 
 USMC Contingency Contracting 
 =
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= =  
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Financial Management 
 Acquisitions via Leasing: MPS case 
 Budget Scoring 
 Budgeting for Capabilities-based Planning 
 Capital Budgeting for the DoD 
 Energy Saving Contracts/DoD Mobile Assets 
 Financing DoD Budget via PPPs 
 Lessons from Private Sector Capital Budgeting for DoD Acquisition 
Budgeting Reform 
 PPPs and Government Financing 
 ROI of Information Warfare Systems 
 Special Termination Liability in MDAPs 
 Strategic Sourcing 
 Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) to Improve Cost Estimates 
Human Resources 
 Indefinite Reenlistment 
 Individual Augmentation 
 Learning Management Systems 
 Moral Conduct Waivers and First-tem Attrition 
 Retention 
 The Navy’s Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Management System 
 Tuition Assistance 
Logistics Management 
 Analysis of LAV Depot Maintenance 
 Army LOG MOD 
 ASDS Product Support Analysis 
 Cold-chain Logistics 
 Contractors Supporting Military Operations 
 Diffusion/Variability on Vendor Performance Evaluation 
 Evolutionary Acquisition 
 Lean Six Sigma to Reduce Costs and Improve Readiness 
 =
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= =  
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 Naval Aviation Maintenance and Process Improvement (2) 
 Optimizing CIWS Lifecycle Support (LCS) 
 Outsourcing the Pearl Harbor MK-48 Intermediate Maintenance 
Activity  
 Pallet Management System 
 PBL (4) 
 Privatization-NOSL/NAWCI 
 RFID (6) 
 Risk Analysis for Performance-based Logistics 
 R-TOC AEGIS Microwave Power Tubes 
 Sense-and-Respond Logistics Network 
 Strategic Sourcing 
Program Management 
 Building Collaborative Capacity 
 Business Process Reengineering (BPR) for LCS Mission Module 
Acquisition 
 Collaborative IT Tools Leveraging Competence 
 Contractor vs. Organic Support 
 Knowledge, Responsibilities and Decision Rights in MDAPs 
 KVA Applied to AEGIS and SSDS 
 Managing the Service Supply Chain 
 Measuring Uncertainty in Earned Value 
 Organizational Modeling and Simulation 
 Public-Private Partnership 
 Terminating Your Own Program 
 Utilizing Collaborative and Three-dimensional Imaging Technology 
 
A complete listing and electronic copies of published research are available on our 



















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
   
 
 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=êÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=ëÅÜççä=çÑ=ÄìëáåÉëë=C=éìÄäáÅ=éçäáÅó=
k~î~ä=éçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=ëÅÜççä=
RRR=avbo=ol^aI=fkdboplii=e^ii=
jlkqbobvI=`^ifclokf^=VPVQP=
www.acquisitionresearch.org 
